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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF COLLAPSE
To compress, to shape, to label the erratic sequences of life is
the perennial function of the judges.'
T HE observation that judges manipulate doctrinal elements to
achieve allocational effects is hardly revolutionary. Neither is it a
solely contemporary phenomenon. The casuistic development of tort
law has been sustained by many reasoning techniques; general rules
have developed exceptions which in turn have metamorphosed into new
general rules,2 analogies have been accepted or rejected,4 and doctrinal
elements have been de-emphasized 5 only to be reemphasized once
again. 6
Doctrinal collapse is part of the lexicon of juridical development."
However, its prevalence in modern and post-modern tort law has been
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1. MORROW'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY QuOTATIONS 311 (Jonathan
Green ed., 1982) (attributed to a 1965 Esquire Magazine article by Sybille Bedford).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 99-104.
3. See, e.g., Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1985) (landlord-tenant relationship
analogized to manufacturer-consumer relationship, leading to application of strict liability),
4. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528 (1971) (refusing to analogize auto-
mobile driving to product manufacture and thus precluding application of strict liability).
5. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (issues such as sensory and contempora-
neous observance were factors to be taken into account in determining foresecability).
6. See. e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (issues such as sensory and contem-
poraneous observance were doctrinal requirements).
7. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and The First Amendment, 139 U
PA. L. REv. 615 (1991). See also Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir.
1990); Robinson v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 771 F. Supp. 1205, 1214 (S.D. Fla. 1991);
Moro-Romero v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No. 89-1821, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20169, at *9
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 1991); United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (D. Dcl.
1988), affd, 879 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1989).
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underestimated." Equally unappreciated is that there are different spe-
cies of collapse. The variations involve discrete judicial motives and
produce radically different results.
This Article examines collapse as a judicial phenomenon, arguing
that cyclical collapsing and uncollapsing of tort doctrines are standard
techniques used by judges as they continually adjust the degree of loss
reallocation and deterrence. To make this argument requires critical
analysis of the doctrinal and meta-doctrinal structures (and labels) of
modern accident law. To substantiate it necessitates exploring certain
causes of action and doctrinal rules that exhibit confusion or compres-
sion, either between allocation models and operational rules or between
different levels of operational rules. Examples of such confusion and
compression attract the label "collapse."
Part II of this Article introduces the allocation model/operational
rules dichotomy upon which the later collapse analysis is premised.
Part III begins the detailed discussion of the collapse concept. Part IV
identifies causes of action in various stages of collapse. Finally, Part V
concludes by suggesting decision-maker value preferences that promote
collapse.
II. ALLOCATION MODELS AND OPERATIONAL RULES
A. Allocation Models
Per conventional wisdom, accident law references three broad allo-
cation models for fact patterns exhibiting socially desirable conduct:0
8. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse In Products Liabil-
ity: The Empty Shell Of Failure To Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 289-311 (1990) (arguing for
less ambiguous standards in failure to warn cases); Jason S. Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and
the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 356-57
(1991) (discussing how legal form evolves through common law process).
9. This discussion is limited to the allocation models and operational rules courts traditionally
apply to otherwise socially desirable activities that result in personal injury or property damage.
Different meta-doctrinal rationales and doctrinal structures apply to conduct that generally is held
to be socially undesirable, principally intentional or deliberate conduct. Of course, it does not
follow that there cannot be overlap at the allocational level, and hence duplication at the opera-
tional level. For example, Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 447 A.2d 84 (Md. App. 1982), was a "chair
pulled out from behind the plaintiff" case. The legal subconscious immediately cross-indexes Gar-
ratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955) (a case of battery when five-year-old pulled chair out
from under arthritic plaintiff, whom he knew was in the process of sitting). But Ghassemleh was
brought in negligence, not battery. Notwithstanding, the court held that in principle the fact pat-
tern could involve liability for either negligence or battery. Ghassemleh, 447 A.2d at 90. Outside
of such simple battery cases, the instinctive "a punch in the nose must be a battery" approach
begins to run out of steam. As a result, the courts have been firmer on battery-negligence territo-
rial disputes. See, e.g., Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 312-13 (Wis. 1973) (listing the
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negligence, strict liability, and absolute liability.10 The placement of
any fact pattern within a particular allocation model has been essen-
tially heuristic, involving rule-of-thumb labeling of fact patterns in a
process informed by historical, conceptual, and even anecdotal or acci-
dental rationales.
Instead of resigning itself to the empirical nature of the process,
much of the literature discussing the "appropriate" allocation models
for types of activities has been overtaken by a politicized debate seek-
ing to establish definitively the original," and, therefore, the (inter-
nally assumed) correct allocation model. 2 This pseudo-historical search
for the original allocation model has its roots in economic analysis.
What is, by now, trite economic analysis suggests that if we lived in a
perfect world without transaction costs, where potential injurers and
victims possessed "perfect information," then the market would guar-
structural reasons why informed consent cases should be brought in negligence not battery).
As a rule, the fact patterns associated with the premodern intentional torts-assault, battery.
false imprisonment, trespass to realty, trespass to personalty, and conversion-are self-limiting.
Because of various historical, social, behavioral, and governmental reasons, the amount of anti-
social conduct that actually exists is relatively finite; a culturization that reduces the level of
judicial concern regarding limits on the numerical incidence of intentional tort exposure. Further-
more, at a political level, redistributive decisions are considerably more difficult to justify when
they flow from socially desirable conduct. See generally Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37
UCLA L. REv. 785, 786-91 (1990); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory 85
HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972) (discusses shift to fault theory of liability); Ernest Weinrib, The Spe-
cial Morality of Tort Law, 34 McGILL LJ. 403 (1989) (outlines morality latent in the structure
of torts); Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348 (1990).
10. These labels only have relative importance, that is, they reflect judicial groupings of fact
patterns with an increasingly greater level of risk redistribution.
11. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the most important contemporary
model-negligence-failed to have any discrete visibility until almost the end of the nineteenth
century. See generally G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 16-19 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century
Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1127 (1990) (rejecting theory that economic efficiency was the domi-
nating force behind nineteenth-century judicial instrumentalism); David G. Owen. The Intellec-
tual Development of Modern Products Liability Law: A Comment on Priest's Vie, of the Cathe-
dral's Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 529 (1985) (critiquing enterprise liability); George L
Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations
of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (describing development and acceptance of
enterprise liability); Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L
REv. 641 (1989) (rejecting subsidy thesis). See also MJ HoRwITz. THE TRANsFoRrtINTIoN OF
AMERICAN LAW 85-108 (1977); FJ. VANDALL. STRICT LIABILITY 1-10 (1989); William Cohen,
Fault and the Automobile Accident: The Last Issue in California, 12 UCLA L REV 164, 165-79
(1964) (discussing no-fault liability); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insur-
ance Externality An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L REV. 129
(1990) (arguing for an economic justification for an enterprise liability regime that does not rec-
ognize the defense of contributory negligence).
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antee the most efficient reduction of accidents and their costs.13 This
reduction, it is said, would occur regardless of whether tort law allo-
cated accident responsibility to defendants (by generally holding them
liable for a particular activity's accident costs)1 4 or to plaintiffs (by
generally not holding defendants liable). 5
Because of transaction costs and other market imperfections, how-
ever, such a world does not exist.'6 As a result, it does seem to matter
where the initial accident avoidance responsibility (liability) rule is
placed; and tort actors apparently will take their risk-management and
insurance cues from this premise. Thus, the search for an allocational
ground zero has distilled to a concentration of scholarship on whether
tort liability, historically, was fault based or strict liability based.17
What matters for the collapse analysis is not why initial place-
ments of fact patterns in particular allocation models have been
made. 8 Rather, the premises that underlie the following analysis are
first, that fact patterns are distributed within relatively gross allocation
models, and second, that fact patterns are not static, they can be moved
both within and between allocation models.' 9
13. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. i (1960).
14. In which case more initial accident reduction costs would be allocated to defendants.
15. In Calabresian terms, primary accident avoidance responsibility would fall on plaintiffs.
See generally GUIDO CALABRESI. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONoMic ANALYSIS
(1970).
16. See generally Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology In
the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL L. REV. 669 (1979) (discussing flaws in Coase Theorem).
17. Cf. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981) (critiquing the "historical search" approach). See generally Mar-
tin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort
Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1231 (1990) (developing a penalty-based descriptive model of tort
doctrine); Wex S. Malon, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law
of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970) (discussing the role of fault in early law); William L. Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [herein-
after Prosser, Fall of the Citadel] (exploring abandonment of privity of contract); William L.
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel] (discussing the requirement of privity of
contract).
18. Otherwise, much more attention would be paid to Calabresi's statement that the correct
approach is to ask: "Who is best suited to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs
and accident avoidance costs? In other words, it would ask who should bear the incentive to
decide correctly, rather than what is the correct decision." Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence
and Accidents, 84 YALE LJ. 656, 666 (1975). See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972) (discussing shift to fault theory of liability).
19. The explicit focus of this Article is not meta-doctrinal, let alone instrumentalist; rather,
the Article concentrates on judicial techniques for executing such choices, whether or not the




Operational rules are less controversial than allocation models. As-
sume that a court assigns a particular fact pattern to a particular allo-
cation model, for instance, by categorizing dentistry within strict liabil-
ity.2" That assignment would be meaningless without some operational
structure to handle individual occurrences of the fact pattern ("cases").
Thus, the court also must provide operational rules ("doctrine") to give
effect to the chosen allocation model.
By definition the operational rules must be faithful to the alloca-
tion model. That is, in the aggregate, the application of the previously
announced operational rules should achieve a quantitative risk redistri-
bution consistent with the allocation model.21 In the dentistry example,
the effect of the assumed strict liability operational rules should be to
redistribute a large number-more than negligence, fewer than abso-
lute liability-of dentistry-related risks.22
In fact, the responsibilities of appellate judges go further than de-
claring grand allocative designs. For their structures to prosper, the de-
clarative courts must closely define the fact pattern they intend to allo-
cate,23 provide information as to the precise risk-redistribution sought,
20. Cf. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), affd, 250 A.2d
129 (N.J. 1969).
21. For purposes of this Article, a negligence allocation model will depend upon fault-oriented
operational rules, whereas an absolute liability model relies upon a simple causation rule. A strict
liability model typically displays operational rules which are not dependent upon personal fault,
yet require a showing of more than causation. See. e.g., Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978).
Unlike absolute liability, strict liability rules may include affirmative defenses premised on
plaintiff misconduct. See Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Lia-
bility: Common Law, Civil Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TuL L REv. 1303, 1329-34 (1988)
(reduction of defenses available to defendant).
22. See generallj Nicolas P. Terry, State of the Art Evidence: From Logical Construct to
Judicial Retrenchment, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 285, 285-90 (1991) (discussion of allocation mod-
els and operational rules).
23. See, e.g., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied. 441 US. 983
(1973), in which the court applied the strict liability rule in the Second Restatement to an acci-
dent involving a gasoline truck. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts §§ 519-520 (1964). The
majority opinion apparently identified the fact pattern as "[t]ransporting gasoline as freight by
truck along the public highways and streets," 502 P.2d at 1187, which provoked a strongly worded
concurrence from Justice Rosellini, who more tightly defined the fact pattern as follows:
I think the opinion should make clear . . . that the owner of the vehicle will be held
strictly liable only for damages caused when the flammable or explosive substance is
allowed to escape without the apparent intervention of any outside force beyond the con-
trol of the manufacturer, the owner, or the operator of the vehicle hauling it. I do not
think the majority means to suggest that if another vehicle, negligently driven, collided
with the truck in question, the truck owner would be held liable for the damage. But
1993]
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and provide operational rules for individual decision making. Needless
to say, these tasks are unlikely to be achieved, or even attempted, at
the same time or even by the same court.2 4 Over time, a hierarchy of
operational rules should develop which, while unlikely to be reminiscent
of some splendidly precise Kelsenian structure, 25 nevertheless will con-
tain rough groupings of tort elements (first-order operational rules),
burdens of proof, and procedural and evidentiary rules.26
C. Structural Imperfections
Whatever the theoretical obligations of our judicial decision mak-
ers, reality tends to intrude. The most common breakdowns in the allo-
cation model/operational rule schema occur when a fact pattern is as-
signed to an allocation model and the assignor either fails to provide
any operational rules or provides inapposite rules.
1. Missing or Ignored Operational Rules
The mere allocation of a fact pattern to an allocation model does
not determine the outcome of an individual case. For example, the as-
signment of a fact pattern to the "strict liability" allocation model does
not guarantee a plaintiff victory2 7 only that more plaintiffs will win as
compared to the situation categorized under negligence.
The failure to appreciate this distinction is illustrated in the well
where, as here, there was no outside force which caused the trailer to become detached
from the truck, the rule of strict liability should apply.
502 P.2d at 1188 (Rosellini, J., concurring). See also Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis.
1977) (plaintiff's suggested fact-pattern shift to strict liability apparently gains judicial approval,
but plaintiff fails to bring himself within fact pattern).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 46-64.
25. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1967).
26. With no great precision, these are referred to as first-, second-, and third-order rules,
respectively. For these purposes, precise agreement as to what are the first order operational rules
is unnecessary. As an example of first-order rules consider § 281 of the Second Restatement,
which states:
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of persons
within which he is included, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an action
for such invasion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).




known case of Anderson v. Somberg,28 which concerned injuries suf-
fered by the plaintiff's decedent when the tip of a surgical instrument
broke off and lodged in his spine during a back operation."0 Plaintiff
alleged negligence against the surgeon and hospital and strict product
liability against the manufacturer and distributor of the instrument.3 0
The evidence suggested that the instrument showed no signs of either a
structural defect or faulty workmanship. 31 When the defendants' ver-
dict was reviewed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the court
stated that "the jury should have been instructed that the failure of any
defendant to prove his nonculpability would trigger liability; and fur-
ther, that since at least one of the defendants could not sustain his
burden of proof, at least one would be liable."
'32
In reversing the traditional burden of proof, the court undertook a
course parallel to various lines of defendant-identification operational
rules. These second-order operational rules bear discrete doctrinal
shapes such as res ipsa loquitur, 33 alternative liability,3 or market
share liability.35 As recognized in Anderson, in adopting such a rule a
court is making an allocational decision that, in this type of fact pat-
tern,36 tends to increase the number of occasions of plaintiff victory.37
28. 338 A.2d I (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 3-4.
32. Id. at 4.
33. E.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). In Ybarra, plaintiff alleged that the
negligence of operating physicians and nurses caused a paralyzing arm injury during the course of
appendectomy. Id. at 688. A res ipsa charge was held proper despite plaintiffs inability, due to
anesthesia, to specify what instrumentality, under exclusive control of which defendant, caused the
injury. Id. at 689-90.
34. E.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). In this case, the two defendants were
hunting and shot at the same time in plaintiff's direction, with one or the other striking him in the
eye. Id. at 2. The court held that each could be held jointly and severally liable absent proof that
he did not fire the shot which struck the plaintiff. Id. at 5.
35. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In
Sindell, plaintiff's mother took DES while pregnant, ultimately causing injury to plaintiff. Id. at
925. Unable to ascertain the DES manufacturer, she brought suit against several drug companies.
Id. The court held that all those composing a "substantial percentage" of the drug market could
each be liable for an amount proportionate to its market share, absent proof that it could not have
produced the DES consumed by plaintiffs mother. Id. at 937.
36. In general terms, the fact pattern is conceptualized as involving a blameless plaintiff who
encounters high information costs regarding the cause of the accident/injury, multiple defendants
with low information costs, and the certainty (or high probability) that the defendant is before the
court.
37. The Anderson court held that:
where an unconscious or helpless patient suffers an admitted mishap not reasonably fore-
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Proponents of the distributional increase might justify it on the basis
that the existing burden of proof will lead to an unacceptable number
of false negatives.3 8 Its opponents usually object on the basis that the
possibility of false positives39 is too high without the guarantee that all
possible defendants are before the court.40
However, a much more serious" attack may be leveled at Anderson.
This goes to the "instruction to convict" which is implicit in the major-
ity approach. 41 The court not only took the view that one of the defend-
ants caused the injury, but also that the unidentified culpable defend-
ant breached a duty he owed. Even with a shift in the burden of proof,
it was theoretically possible for the defendants charged with negligence
to exculpate themselves. It follows, therefore, that the court believed
the strict liability defendants could not exculpate themselves. In other
words, if a strict liability defendant caused an injury, he would be
liable.
This is a fundamental misunderstanding of strict liability, and
more specifically strict product liability. Strict liability depends upon
more than proof of causation; it requires proof of failure to meet an
objective standard.42 Thus, even with a shift in the burden of proof in
favor of plaintiffs, it is still theoretically possible for a strict liability
defendant to avoid liability.43 A strict liability allocation model sug-
gests increased numerical occasions of liability, not liability as a matter
seeable and unrelated to the scope of the surgery (such as cases where foreign objects are
left in the body of the patient), those who had custody of the patient, and who owed him
a duty of care as to medical treatment, or not to furnish a defective instrument for use in
such treatment, can be called to account for their default. They must prove their
nonculpability, or else risk liability for the injuries suffered.
338 A.2d at 5.
38. In this context false negatives occur when deserving plaintiffs lose.
39. False positives occur when undeserving plaintiffs win.
40. This is in contrast to the paradigm Summers v. Tice scenario. This criticism (that not all
the defendants are present) was not taken lightly and was the primary reason why the Supreme
Court of California in Sindell v. Abbott Labs developed the more fact-sensitive market share
approach. The dissent in Anderson forcefully defends the latter point. 338 A.2d at 9-10.
41. The court stated, "Since at least one of the defendants could not sustain his burden of
proof, at least one would be liable." 338 A.2d at 4.
42. In this type of quality control case, a consumer expectations test is applied. In practice it
depends upon identification of a product's factual defect. For a discussion of factual defect, see
Nicolas P. Terry, Stricter Products Liability, 52 Mo. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (1987).
43. The only other way of looking at Anderson is to view the majority's burden shift as being
an alteration in the allocation model applied to product liability defendants in "conspiracy of
silence" groups, to use the Ybarra image. See 338 A.2d at I 1 n.5 (Mountain, J., dissenting); Id.
at 7 n.2 (majority's response).
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of law." While the occasional opinion might try to make a political
point by equating strict liability with imposing the role of insurer on a
particular defendant class,45 the conventional view is that strict liability
is a relative model signaling only an increase (compared to negligence)
in risk redistribution. However, other than at unlikely theoretical ex-
tremes (e.g., all occasions of loss will be redistributed), allocation mod-
els make little sense without conforming operational rules.
2. Inapposite Operational Rules
Typically, and consistent with a casuistic approach to doctrinal de-
velopment, inapposite operational rules are most likely to appear fol-
lowing the recognition of a new cause of action or the inter- or intra-
model movement of a fact pattern.46 In all the excitement of doctrinal
development, the operational rules are forgotten, or poorly expressed. A
classic example is the development of strict product liability in Califor-
nia.47 That development began in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,48
with a modification to the negligence operational rule."9 This modifica-
tion, which affected the burden of proof, was designed to increase the
44. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, a product liability case in which the court observed correctly
the consequences of strict liability:
The term strict liability in tort might be misconstrued and, if so. would be a misnomer.
Strict liability does not make the manufacturer or seller an insurer nor does it impose
absolute liability. From the plaintiffs' point of view the most beneficial aspect of the rule
is that it relieves him of proving specific acts of negligence and protects him from the
defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer, and lack of privity in the implied warranty con-
cepts of sales and contracts.
155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis. 1967). See also Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162. 1166
(Cal. 1978) ("From its inception . . . strict liability has never been, and is not now, absolute
liability. . . . [U]nder strict liability the manufacturer does not thereby become the insurer of the
safety of the product's user.").
45. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 552-53 (Cal. 1991)
("strict liability. . . was never intended to make the manufacturer or distributor or a product its
insurer[]"); Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. D. 1865) (per Baron Martin, "to hold
the defendant liable without negligence would be to constitute him an insurer"), rev'd. L.R. I Ex.
265 (1866), afd, [1861-73] All E.R. I (H.L. 1868).
46. Indeed, the party arguing for the relocation of a fact pattern will fare better if she supplies
new operational rules. For example, in Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977). the plain-
tiff was almost successful in going counter-trend in malpractice cases by suggesting operational
rules (albeit borrowed from product liability) when arguing that certain malpractice cases should
be moved to a strict liability allocation model. See infra note 114.
47. For a primer on product liability generally, see Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
48. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
49. Id. (res ipsa loquitur used to promote shift in the burden of proof).
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redistribution of risk in manufacturing defect- cases.50 However, the
seminal California case was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,"1
which introduced, for all the expected (and now somewhat simplistic
sounding) meta-legal reasons, a strict liability allocation model.52 Yet,
Greenman failed to provide any operational rules beyond the phrase"proves to have a defect that causes injury,"53 and a later reference to
"defective. 54
Subsequent to Greenman, the defendant in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp.,55 sought to introduce the Restatement's "unreasonably danger-
ous" first-order operational rule.56 This was rejected with one of the
first recorded "smacks of negligence" arguments. When used, this ar-
gument identifies a proposed operational rule as originating in the neg-
ligence model, and labels it inconsistent, or potentially inconsistent,
50. The ever elusive doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has two roles in products liability. The first,
and one that the doctrine fulfills, is to enable certain negligence-based manufacturing defect cases
to get to the jury on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. In this context, res ipsa operates in
a manner consistent with its application in conventional negligence law. That is, a court applies
the doctrine to fact patterns in which it is considered that the risk of false positives ("undeserved"
recovery) with the doctrine invoked is (to the court) significantly less than the risk of false nega-
tives (no recovery for "deserving" plaintiff) with the doctrine not invoked. These "ordinarily would
not occur in the absence of negligence" and "exclusive control" prerequisites for a res ipsa instruc-
tion (or as more elegantly stated in Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 13 (Alaska
1978), the "foundation facts") are designed to implement that rationale at both the fact-pattern
and fact-sensitive levels, respectively.
It follows that res ipsa is more about identifying the risk-taker than modifying the standard
of care (i.e., it is more factual than normative). Notwithstanding, res ipsa does redistribute risks
which would otherwise have been false negatives. Therefore, the doctrine does have allocational
effects. Indeed, those effects explain the second role that res ipsa has (or rather had) in products
liability law.
In the course of the shift to strict liability during the second third of the twentieth century,
res ipsa also provided some jurisdictions with an unannounced intermediate allocation model posi-
tioned between negligence and strict liability. The model's operational rules (using circumstantial
evidence and, in some jurisdictions, a shift in the burden of proof) could be invoked without
openly making a break with negligence. Indeed, the intermediate nature of the "negligence plus
res ipsa" rule reflected the judicial ambivalence toward the then current basis of liability. Escola
is a prime example of res ipsa operating in both its roles.
51. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
52. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being." Id. at 900.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
56. Section 402A(l) provides: "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer ... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
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with the strict liability allocation model.5 7 In spite of defense argu-
ments that using the singular and undefined "defective" standard was
consistent with an absolute rather than a strict liability allocation
model, the Supreme Court of California was unable or unwilling to
reformulate its operational rule.58 The Cronin court took this position
on the basis that the Restatement position would redistribute too few
risks to be consistent with a strict liability model."" The reality was that
the Cronin position itself was untenable, as it redistributed too many
product-related risks, veering toward an absolute liability model. The
issue finally was resolved in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.60 The
Barker court remained committed to a strict liability, rather than a
negligence, allocation model.6' As in Cronin, the Barker court dis-
agreed with an "unreasonably dangerous" instruction:6 2
[A] product may be found defective in design, so as to subject
a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries, under
either of two alternative tests. First, a product may be found
defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would ex-
pect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-
ner. Second, a product may alternatively be found defective in
design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to estab-
lish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the bene-
57. See, e.g., Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1161-62 ("The result of the limitation, however, has not
been merely to prevent the seller from becoming an insurer of his products with respact to all
harm generated by their use. Rather, it has burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an ele-
ment which rings of negligence.").
58. Id. at 1163.
59. Id. at 1162. ("A bifurcated standard is of necessity more difficult to prove than a unitary
one. But merely proclaiming that the phrase 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous' requires
only a single finding would not purge that phrase of its negligence complexion.")
60. 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978). Although Barker settled the matter for well orver a
decade, the recent California opinion in Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.. 810 P.2d
549 (Cal. 1991), while a warning case (Barker concerned a design defect allegation), and al-
though replete with statements that design issues were "not here in issue," see. e.g., Id. at 551 n.2,
nevertheless can be read as the initiation of a thorough review of California product law.
61. Note the court's "continued adherence to the principle that, in a product liability action.
the trier of fact must focus on the product, not on the manufacturer's conduct, and that the
plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer acted unreasonably or negligently in order to pre-
vail in such an action." 573 P.2d at 447.
62. Id. at 446.
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fits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger, inher-
ent in such design."3
Note how the court commingled two first-order operational rules64 and
how the risk-utility limb of the formulation was fine tuned with a sec-
ond-order rule, the burden of proof-all to achieve the precise alloca-
tion of product-related risks the court favored.
III. How TO COLLAPSE A TORT
Clarifying the distinction between, and interaction of, allocation
models and operational rules is key to appreciating the idea of collapse.
Equally important is the realization that there is more than one type of
collapse.
A. Vertical Collapse
A vertical collapse occurs when an allocation model and its opera-
tional rules are intermingled, or otherwise rendered less than discrete.
The operative aspect of the collapse is that the decision as to how many
risks associated with the fact pattern should be redistributed (the allo-
cation model) does not receive recognition discrete from that fact pat-
tern's individual, case-specific, decisional (operational) rules.65
Take two well known strict liability torts, product liability and ul-
trahazardous activities.66 The former is uncollapsed, 67 the latter is ver-
tically collapsed.
Assume that, as in most jurisdictions, the state of Xanadu's su-
preme court has held that the product liability/personal injury fact
63. Id. at 455-56.
64. Most jurisdictions use either consumer expectations or risk-utility. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 119-29.
65. At first blush the traditional intentional torts, such as assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment appear to be vertically collapsed, in that the formulaic inquiry into whether defendant in-
tended to cause an offensive or harmful contact, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18
(1965), appears to be determinative of both fact-pattern allocation and case-specific operation. In
fact, it seems more likely that the courts, rather than collapsing the inquiry, merely perform their
allocational modeling "off-camera," with a hidden, duty-like analysis which applies the intentional
torts to broad categories of anti-social behavior that jeopardize our fundamental interests in per-
son and property. Where intentional torts do look more collapsed is in their more modern itera-
tions which have been influenced by negligence doctrinal structures; an obvious example being
intentional infliction of emotional harm, see id. § 46, where the "extreme and outrageous" rule
seems to dominate both the allocation model and its operational rules.
66. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict
Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 970-1003 (1981) (developments in strict liability).
67. This observation is limited to the paradigm design defect case.
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pattern attracts a strict liability allocation model.08 After making that
broad allocational decision, the Xanadu courts"" should provide point-
ers70 to suggest just how strict its model is, and operational rules that
will achieve a numerical risk redistribution consistent with the alloca-
tional decision.
If the Xanadu judges perform these functions, they will be pre-
pared when a product liability fact pattern subsequently comes before a
Xanadu court. At that time, the parties and decision maker will expend
relatively minor administrative costs in determining the general tenor
of the case and the operational rules that will govern the case through
the various procedural stages and jury instructions.71
Contrast the same court dealing with an alleged ultrahazardous
activity. Assume that the supreme court of Xanadu has adopted the
Restatement position. The Restatement provides that "[o]ne who car-
ries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm
to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm. 1 2 At
the risk of stating the obvious, this creates a strict liability tort. It is
not negligence-based because the defendant's "utmost care" is irrele-
vant. Neither is it an absolute liability tort; affirmative defenses are
permitted,7 3 and the plaintiff must prove something other than causa-
tion. That "something other" is contained in section 520, which pro-
vides for the consideration of certain risk-utility and geographical-loca-
tion factors.7 4
68. Of course, modem product liability in most jurisdictions extends beyond this paradigm
fact pattern, to include bystanders, other sellers, and other types of injury.
69. Recall the protracted gestation in California at supra text accompanying notes 48-64.
70. Some of which may double as operational rules. See Infra text accompanying notes 91-
109.
71. Obviously, additional administrative and transaction costs will be incurred if a party at-
tempts to characterize the actual facts as not coming within the product liability fact pattern, e.g..
by arguing that the root transaction was a service and not a sale.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 519(1) (1965).
73. See id. § 523 ("The plaintiffs assumption of the risk of harm from an abnormally danger-
ous activity bars his recovery for the harm."). Similarly, § 524 provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is
not a defense to the strict liability of one who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity.
(2) The plaintiffs contributory negligence in knowingly and unreasonably subjecting
himself to the risk of harm from the activity is a defense to the strict liability.
Id. § 524. Cf. Harper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 737 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(applying comparative fault principles in case of exploding automobile battery).
74. Section 520 of the Restatement provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to
1993]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
Assume that a plaintiff is injured when a rail car transporting nat-
ural gas explodes .7  There are two possible scenarios, depending upon
whether the supreme court of Xanadu previously decided that the
transportation of natural gas is an "abnormally dangerous activity." 76
First, consider the scenario where there is no Xanadu precedent.
What determines the allocation model to which the gas transportation
attaches? If this was a product liability cause of action, complex meta-
legal considerations would determine whether the general fact pattern
attracted strict liability, followed by a fact-sensitive inquiry into
whether this particular fact pattern was included (i.e., a categorization
decision followed by a characterization stage). Both of these steps
would precede any operational liability determination. However, with
the abnormally dangerous tort, the categorization decision (the crucial
inquiry as to the allocation model to be followed), is dictated by section
520. Assume that the court applies the six-part risk-utility analysis and
determines that this occurrence of gas transportation is so covered. In a
product liability case, that allocation model decision would be followed
by the application of appropriate operational rules. But the ul-
trahazardous tort has no discrete operational phase. Rather, it collapses
its allocation or categorization decision into its case-by-case liability
determinant. In other words, the risk-utility analysis mandated by sec-
tion 520 becomes determinative of both the allocation model and the
operational rule.
Assume secondly, and in the alternative, that prior Xanadu prece-
dent exists, establishing that gas transportation is indeed an ul-
be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977)
75. See generally Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113 (Kan. 1987) (denying applica-
tion of §§ 519-520 to natural gas transmission); Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d
856, 862 (Minn. 1984) (same); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 687
P.2d 212 (Wash. 1984) (same). Cf. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (strict
liability imposed on transportation of gasoline by road). See also Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co.,
418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982) (refusing to hold utility company absolutely liable when its activity of
transmitting electricity caused injury).
76. Of course, this assumes that the Xanadu court has some sense of precedent.
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trahazardous activity. What would be left for the court to decide in
our hypothetical case? On the assumption that there was no factual
doubt that our case involved gas transportation, the court would be left
with a simple causation inquiry. However, making liability dependent
solely upon a showing of cause is a strong indicia of an absolute rather
than a strict liability allocation model.78
In both scenarios the logical progression from allocation model to
logically derived operational rules is supplanted by self-referencing cir-
cularity. 9 In both cases vertical collapse hinders cogent prediction of
liability determinations.
B. Horizontal Collapse
The second kind of collapse occurs when what are arguably dis-
crete operational rules are collapsed or intermingled. Typically this will
involve two or more first-order operational rules; i.e., the basic doctrinal
elements of a tort.
Assume that Xanadu has long populated its negligence tort with,
inter alia, the apparently discrete doctrinal elements of duty, risk-
assessment, contributory (or comparative) negligence, and assumption
of risk. Assume further that the Xanadu courts have appreciated for
some time that implied assumption of risk 0 has affinities to both duty
and contributory negligence;81 Xanadu courts frequently have referred
77. Assumedly, such precedent was premised on § 520. Cf. Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978) (moving blasting cases from case.by-case
§ 520 consideration to categorical determination that blasting is ultrahazardous activity).
78. As has been said of Rylands v. Fletcher, [1861-73] All E.R. 1 (H.L. 1868), ajJ'g LR. I
Ex. 265 (1866), the historical antecedent to §§ 519-520, "Rylands looks only to the resulting
harm and creates absolute liability on the part of the defendant and no negligence or defect need
be shown." Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666. 684 (W. Va. 1979). Not-
withstanding, some courts refer to Rylands liability as of the absolute variety. See. e.g.. Yukon,
585 P.2d at 1207-08.
79. Vertical collapse explains the confusion between strict liability and negligence. See
Palmer, supra note 21, at 1304-08.
80. In contrast to express assumption of risk dealing with contractual disclaimers. See. e.g.,
Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (holding invalid an express
release from future negligence as a condition of admission to a charitable hospital because it
affected a public interest); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1989) (holding
exculpatory clause valid notwithstanding failure to expressly use the terms "negligence" and
"breach of warranty"); Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057 (Wyo. 1986) (upholding express
release signed by skydiving student in favor of her instructors). Even courts that have collapsed
implied assumption into other doctrinal elements have tended to reserve express assumption. See.
e.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1130 (La. 1988); Anderson v. Ceccardi, 451
N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ohio 1983).
81. See, e.g., Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90. 93 (NJ. 1959). The
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to the duty-resembling assumption as "primary" and the plaintiff mis-
conduct assumption of risks as "secondary." However, since both an
absence of duty and a finding of contributory negligence traditionally
would bar the.plaintiff's claim, 82 the distinction between primary and
secondary assumption did not come to the forefront of discussion until
comparative fault principles began their assault on plaintiff misconduct
doctrine.-Thus, when Xanadu adopted comparative fault, the supreme
court simultaneously endorsed the horizontal collapse of the heretofore
distinct operational rules with the following statement:
We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative
negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assump-
tion of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability
in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the
form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant
of contributory negligence.83
The question arises, however, whether Xanadu was correct in col-
lapsing assumption of risk into duty and comparative negli-
gence-whether assumption of risk really had involved a double doctri-
nal redundancy. Little concern seems to have been engendered by
collapsing primary assumption into duty. Clearly, both are conclusory
labels with approximately the same function of designating general fact
patterns in which the net loss reallocation will be zero.
The debate over the collapse of secondary assumption into com-
parative negligence has been joined more forcefully. 4 Of course, it is
court stated:
[A]ssumption of risk has two distinct meanings. In one sense (sometimes called its "pri-
mary" sense), it is an alternate expression for the proposition that defendant was not
negligent, Le., either owed no duty or did not breach the duty owed. In its other sense
(sometimes called "secondary"), assumption of risk is an affirmative defense to an estab-
lished breach of duty. In its primary sense, it is accurate to say plaintiff assumed the risk
whether or not he was "at fault", for the truth thereby expressed in alternate terminology
is that defendant was not negligent. But in its secondary sense, i.e., as an affirmative
defense to an established breach of defendant's duty, it is incorrect to say plaintiff as-
sumed the risk whether or not he was at fault.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Anderson v. Ceccardi, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ohio 1983).
83. Of course the quote actually is from Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1227, 1241 (Cal.
1975). See also Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 293 (Fla. 1977).
84. The debate is not new. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20
HARV. L. RaV. 14, 17-18 (1906) (arguing that "[i]t is essential that the two ideas should be kept
quite distinct"); Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 723 (1953)
(comparing contributory negligence and negligence). See also David W. Robertson, Ruminations
on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines In
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difficult to argue redundancy when the indicted concepts are suscepti-
ble to discrete definition. Referenced to an objective test,
"[c]ontributory negligence was described as the inadvertent or uninten-
tional failure of the plaintiff to exercise due care for his own safety." 85
In contrast, assumption of risk is "purportedly distinguishable from
contributory negligence because it [is] governed by a subjective test,
which require[s] an inquiry into whether the plaintiff actually knew of
the risk and voluntarily confronted the danger."' 86 Nevertheless, the
well documented overlap between the two defenses made it difficult for
courts to resist collapse.87 As a result, eschewing doctrinal richness for
procedural simplicity, Xanadu and many other jurisdictions have for-
feited the ability to fine tune and particularize their messages of dis-
pleasure at plaintiff misconduct.
A few courts have staged something of a rearguard action. Not-
withstanding their grudging acceptance of the collapse of primary as-
sumption into duty and overlapping secondary assumption into compar-
"ative fault, these courts have argued for an uncollapsed species of
assumption of risk styled "reasonable implied assumption of risk."88
The core of this defensive argument is that "the plaintiff's reasonable
conduct in encountering a known danger raises the inference that he
has agreed to relieve the defendant of his duty of care,"'89 as distinct
from the "unreasonable assumption of risk" that overlaps with compar-
ative negligence.
In fact, the resulting dispute itself involves competing models of
horizontal collapse. At first blush, the argument for a discrete "reason-
able conduct" defense appears to call for uncollapsing the assumption
of risk defense (secondary assumption), permitting courts once again to
Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 LA. L REV, 1341. 1373 (1984) (argu-
ing that "[t]he only agreeable resolution is abolition of assumed risk as a defense separate from
comparative fault"); Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption Of Risk And Consent In The Law Of
Torts: A Theory Of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L REv. 213, 270-71 (1987) (arguing that compara-
tive fault should not absorb assumption of risk); Matthew J. Toddy, Comment, Assumption of
Risk Merged with Contributory Negligence: Anderson v. Ceccardi, 45 Onto ST U 1059, 1070-
71 (1984) (arguing that comparative negligence should absorb assumption of risk).
85. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1127 (La. 1988).
86. Id. at 1127-28.
87. Id. at 1128 ("A conceptual difficulty arises from the fact that a plaintiff who knowingly
and voluntarily encounters an unreasonable risk of injury may usually be described as one whose
conduct has fallen below the standard of due care which would be exercised by a reasonable man
under similar circumstances.").
88. See, e.g., Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 255 Cal. Rptr. 755. 759-60 (1989).
89. Id. at 760 (emphasis added).
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associate specific deterrence messages with certain types of plaintiff
misconduct. In reality, the argument for "reasonable implied assump-
tion of risk" seeks to uncollapse aspects of primary assumption of risk.
This would resemble a fact-intensive primary assumption of risk (i.e.
duty) inquiry.90 Thus, while purporting to uncollapse assumption of
risk, an acceptance of "reasonable implied assumption of risk" would
tend to collapse abstract duty determinations into fact-intensive plain-
tiff knowledge/conduct inquiries.9 1 Not surprisingly, this uncollapse-by-
collapsing approach has been resisted. 2
C. Distinguishing Synergy from Collapse
Although a world of distinct components seems attractive from a
rigid analytical standpoint, reality intrudes. Allocation models and op-
erational rules are discrete but not isolated concepts; they exhibit a use-
ful synergy. Such synergy should not be equated with collapse, al-
though it can precede it.
The primary reason for this synergy is that our present allocation
models are quite gross. In the world of socially desirable conduct, we
have only three recognized allocation models: negligence, strict liabil-
ity, and absolute liability. Only occasionally does it seem that an addi-
tional model, such as "stricter liability,"9 " might develop.
As a result, the delineation of the exact amount of redistribution
90. If it is accepted that (a) primary assumption is equivalent to a no-duty argument, and (b)
duty/no-duty arguments are abstract, this is a misnomer.
91. See infra text accompanying note 255.
92. For example, in Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992), the court noted:
Such an approach not only would be inconsistent with the principles of fairness . ..
but also would be inimical to the fair and efficient administration of justice. If the appli-
cation of the assumption of risk doctrine in a sports setting turned on the particular
plaintiff's subjective knowledge and awareness, summary judgment rarely would be avail-
able in such cases, for . . . it frequently will be easy to raise factual questions with
regard to a particular plaintiff's subjective expectations as to the existence and magni-
tude of the risks the plaintiff voluntarily chose to encounter. By contrast, the question of
the existence and scope of a defendant's duty of care is a legal question which depends on
the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties' general relationship to
the activity, and is an issue to be decided by the court, rather than the jury. Thus, the
question of assumption of risk is much more amenable to resolution by summary judg-
ment under a duty analysis than under the dissenting opinion's suggested implied consent
approach.
Id. at 702 (citation omitted). See also Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992) (companion case
to Knight). Cf Knight, 834 P.2d at 712-13 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing for the elimination of the assumption-of-risk doctrine).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 151-54. See also Terry, supra note 42, at 14-21 (cx-
plaining the development of strict liability).
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expected of a fact pattern is passed off to the labels of our better known
first-order operational rules. For example, take the basic allocation
models for socially desirable, yet injury-producing, activities. Assume
that a court has decided to permit a cause of action concerning two
distinct physician-patient fact patterns. Both involve injuries allegedly
suffered by patients as a result of the acts or omissions of physi-
cians-the first as a result of the manner in which a surgical procedure
was performed, the second flowing from a physician's failure to inform
the patient of the risks of the procedure.
Assume further that for various structural or meta-legal reasons,
the court decides to place both fact patterns in the negligence alloca-
tion model. 94 However, the court believes that more informed-consent
risks should be redistributed rather than surgical risks.05 Therefore, the
two fact patterns appear within the same model, but with importantly
different allocational intentions.
The solution to this crisis of labeling is to use the appropriate oper-
ational rules as pointers toward the degree of redistribution. For exam-
ple, within negligence there are three broad first-order operational
rules. The least redistributive is custom,9 6 the most is risk-utility,07 with
the reasonable person standard occupying some middle ground. As a
result, unnamed and unnameable allocation model specifics become
known by reference to their operational rule surrogatesY8
94. This seems to be the almost unassailable common law position, beginning with Slater v.
Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 863 (K.B. 1767) and Cross v. Guthcry, 2 Root 90, 91
(Conn. 1794), and surviving the movement away from a locality rule, Small v. Howard, 128 Mass.
131, 136 (1880), overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968), to a national
standard of care, Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979); Brune v. Belinkoff, 235
N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 870 (Miss. 1985). Cf. Magrine v.
Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (Botter, J.S.C., dissenting), afd, 250
A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969). See generally Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977).
95. This comports with the majority position. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal.).
cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988).
96. After Vaughan v. Menlove, [1835-42] All E.R. 156 (Ct. Common Pleas), rejected a sub-
jective, good-faith standard of care in favor of a "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" standard
for negligence law, the most subjective (and hence least distributive) judgmental standard is cus-
tom. In addition, professional negligence cases typically require expert testimony, placing an addi-
tional burden on plaintiff.
97. Risk-utility is generally the most redistributive because it is the least subjective and the
most objective standard by which to judge conduct.
98. A similar approach is taken in positioning fact patterns between allocation models. For
example, Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d I (Alaska 1978), kept "in-flight injuries
to aircraft passengers caused by turbulence" fact patterns within negligence, but mw;ed "aircraft
crash" fact patterns to an intermediate status by utilizing a burden-shifting version of res ipsa
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Indeed, there is a symbiotic relationship between an allocation
model and its operational rules, for the latter constantly further define
and inform the allocation model whose work they seek to accomplish.
This relationship is dynamic as well as informational.
The dynamic element in the allocation-model/operational-rules di-
chotomy is a paradoxical function of model and rules being unsyn-
chronized. At one level this incongruity can engender confusion and
distrust, as tort law appears overly susceptible to characterization and
manipulation. However, at another level, the dynamic, dialogic nature
of the relationship provides the vehicle for the continued casuistic de-
velopment of the common law of torts.
This latter attribute was demonstrated by Levi with his classic ex-
position of the doctrinal development of Anglo-American product lia-
bility law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.99 Levi stud-
ied the breakdown of the "inherently dangerous" rule. This rule
operated as an exception to the privity rule. In its broad effect the priv-
ity rule held that a product liability plaintiff could not bring her negli-
gence claim against a remote manufacturer. 100 Levi traced the develop-
ment of the inherently dangerous exception from its first hesitant
steps, 101 through its initial judicial endorsement,102 to its consumption
of the privity rule. This last stage occurred when Judge Cardozo, in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 03 held that all defective products
were to be included within the "exceptional" category. 04 From this,
loquitur.
99. EDWARD H. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (1949). See also
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 676-77 (W. Va. 1979).
100. The court in Winterbottom v. Wright noted that:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue,
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the up-
setting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such
contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842); see also LeBourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 80 N.E. 482, 483
(Mass. 1907); Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870); Earl v. Lubbock, I K.B. 253 (1905).
Winterbottom has also been explained on the basis of the omission-commission distinction in
tort law: an actor has no duty to act, but if she does act she must do so carefully. See FRANCIS H.
BOHLEN. STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 115 n.77, 236-37 (1926). Under this analysis the defend-
ant in Winterbottom had not negligently repaired the coach, but at most had only breached its
contract by failure to repair.
101. E.g., Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. of Pleas 1837).
102. Longmeid v. Holliday, 155 Eng. Rep. 752 (Ex. 1851); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y.
396, 411,(1852).
103. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
104. Id. at 1054-55. This issue was to trouble Judge Cardozo again in Palsgraf v. Long Island
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Levi exposed a classical common law developmental technique, that of
rules being changed through the development of exceptions until, the
exceptions outnumbering the non-exceptional cases, a breakthrough
case fashioned a new rule modeled more on the exceptions.
Differently stated, the allocation model applied to the manufac-
turer-consumer fact pattern in the early nineteenth century called for
zero redistribution; the operational rule giving this effect being a "no-
duty" rule. However, operational rules began to be utilized (exceptions
based on fraud 0 5 and failure to warn, 100 along with the dangerous per
se category examined by Levi107) which were inconsistent with the allo-
cation model. By the time of Judge Cardozo's intervention in MacPher-
son, the allocation model and its operational rules were seriously out of
alignment. Cardozo could have rejected the exceptional operational
rules or changed the allocation model; he chose the latter.
This pattern repeats in the twentieth century. MacPherson's negli-
gence allocation model for product-related injuries adopted standard
negligence operational rules.10 8 However, by the mid-1960s courts had
made subtle modifications to the negligence operational rules (such as
the rejection of custom as conclusive' and the utilization of res ipsa
loquitur" 0) and fundamental changes to overlapping warranty law
(such as the re-abandonment of vertical privity by using a dangerous
R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). In Britain, Lord Atkin went one step further, directly coun-
tering the privity rule, and fashioning a general duty of care from the remains of the inherently
dangerous exception. Donoghue v. Stevenson. (1932] All E.R. I (H.L.). In Donoghue, the plaintiff
drank a ginger beer and ice cream float purchased by a friend from the defendant tavern-owner.
Allegedly, when the friend poured the last of the ginger beer over the plaintiffs ice cream, the
remains of a decomposed snail floated out of the bottle. The court held the manufacturer could be
liable notwithstanding the lack of privity. As stated by Lord Atkin,
[A] manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends
them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasona-
ble possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of
reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in injury to
the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.
Id. at 20.
105. E.g., Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
106. E.g., Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
107. For a slightly different statement of the exceptional cases, see Huset v. J.l. Case Thresh-
ing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
108. 111 N.E. at 1053, 1055.
109. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) ("[Industry] never may set its own tests.
however persuasive be its usages."), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
110. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). See also Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932) (strict liability on seller of chattels irrespective of either
privity or absence of fraud or negligence). Baxter was adopted by the ALI in the Second Restate-
ment. See RESTATMtIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
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per se categorization,"' and the attack on sellers' disclaimers of liabil-
ity" 2 ). As a result, the courts were redistributing more product-related
risks than contemplated by the allocation model. That inconsistency
was remedied by Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc."3 and the
prescient ALI with section 402A, changing the allocation model to
strict liability and regaining consistency between the allocation model
and its operational rules." 4
Allocation models and operational rules require a healthy dia-
logue. It is only when that dialogue becomes fatally unbalanced that
there is collapse.
IV. COLLAPSED AND UNCOLLAPSED TORTS
Although the distinctions between vertical and horizontal collapse
and between collapse and synergy are reasonably clear, the other major
variable in the collapse matrix, the degree of collapse experienced by
any one tort in any one jurisdiction at any one time, is less capable of
precise rendering. Nevertheless, some relatively intuitive distinctions
can be made using the nomenclature of "highly collapsed," "partially
collapsed," and "uncollapsed." With the caveat that all torts structures
tend to exhibit some degree of collapse, or at least an overlapping of
11I. See Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 17, at 1110-14. See generally Prosser,
Fall of the Citadel, supra note 17.
112. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
113. See supra text accompanying note 50.
114. Strikingly similar doctrinal developments occurred in medical malpractice law during the
1970s. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
(holding that hospitals can be held strictly liable for nonprofessional services); Clark v. Gibbons,
426 P.2d 525, 535 (Cal. 1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring) (stating that a jury instruction on condi-
tional res ipsa loquitur was proper in an operation room accident); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981,
984 (Wash. 1974) (Utter, J., concurring) (arguing for a greater duty of care when there exists a
simple, well-known harmless test such as a glaucoma test). After those Escola-like balloons were
floated, the literature blossomed, focusing both on rationales for a shift in allocation models and
suggesting operational rules. See, e.g., Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service
Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661. See also
Frank J. Vandall, Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis, 59
IND. L.J. 25 (1983). However, unlike product liability, malpractice law failed to make the final
move to strict liability. See Nicolas P. Terry, The Malpractice Crisis in the United States: A
Dispatch From the Trenches, 2 PROF. NEGL 145, 149-50 (1986). Thus, strict liability in the
malpractice field has been restricted to a few legislative interventions. See, e.g., The Virginia
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5000 (Michie
1990). Ironically, the recent interest in practice guidelines as operational rules may well lead to
renewed interest in a different, presumably stricter allocation model. See. e.g., Clark C. Havig-
hurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. Louis U. L. 777
(1990); Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for
Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1989).
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their doctrinal structures, it is the uncollapsed category that is the sim-
plest to illustrate.
A. Uncollapsed Torts
1. Design Defect Product Liability Cases
Design defect cases have demonstrated a resolve first to extricate
themselves from any vertical collapse, 115 and second to have studiously
avoided a horizontal collapse. As previously discussed,""" twentieth-
century product liability doctrine exhibited a clear determination to
shift the manufacturer-consumer/personal-or-property injury fact pat-
tern away from the negligence allocation model. However, considerable
hurdles lay ahead. First, the seminal judicial discussion of the future
allocation model was phrased in terms of absolute liability. 17 Second,
neither the negligence-sounding operational rule of section 402A1  nor
the stark, almost absolute-sounding Greenman,119 suggested that there
were grounds for optimism in avoiding collapse.
However, and as generally accepted, collapse was averted because
of two major developments. First, a surprising judicial consensus rap-
idly developed that the allocation model should be a strict liability one;
that is, design-defect product liability would eschew both causation
(absolute) 2 ' and producer-conduct (negligence) 121 allocation models.
Second, the courts moved with alacrity to develop consistent opera-
tional rules for design cases.
Initially, the Restatement's "consumer expectations" test for legal
defectiveness' 22 proved to be a misstep, susceptible to interpretations
115. See supra text accompanying note 50.
116: See supra text accompanying notes 108-14.
117. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring). However, the opinion is ambiguous at best" as to whether absolute liability as we now
know it was being contemplated, or was merely considered synonymous with strict liability.
118. See supra note 56.
119. Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
120. See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 845-46 (N.H. 1978) ('Un-
like workmen's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance, strict liability is not a no-fault
system of compensation."). Cf. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla.
1974).
121. Cf. Friend v. General Motors Corp., 165 S.E.2d 734, 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (Pannell,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 167 S.E.2d 926 (Ga. 1969), rev'd by G&. CODE ANN, § 105-106
(Harrison 1968). See also Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976) (negligence as
a matter of law).
122. For a discussion of legal defectiveness, see Terry, supra note 42. at 21-24.
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inconsistent with the strict liability allocation model.123 Today, most
jurisdictions either have explicitly adopted a risk-utility test for legal
defectiveness, 24 or at least recognize that "consumer expectations" is a
conclusory label for a performed risk-utility analysis. 125 Given its objec-
tive, impersonal approach to liability, the adoption of risk-utility as the
test for legal defectiveness clearly was consistent with the increased dis-
tribution demanded by the new allocation model. However, it was not
by itself decisive, because twentieth-century accident law strongly asso-
ciated risk-utility analysis with a negligence allocation model. 20 To
counter this perception, courts began to move the focus of the risk-
utility analysis from the producer to the product. 27
123. At one extreme the test may be interpreted as more appropriate for an absolute liability
allocation model. E.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967) (consumers do not
expect any defects). At the other extreme it may be interpreted as an inquiry into what manufac-
turers believe consumers expect, and so more consistent with a custom-influenced operational rule
and hence a negligence allocation model.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 47-63 (discussing the development of California law).
See also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979); Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cal Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 303
(N.J. 1983).
125. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975). Cf. Fahy
v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 740 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 (1988); Nes-
selrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
126. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned
Hand, J.). Posner's "rediscovery" of the Hand formula reinforced that linkage. See generally
Richard A. Posner, A Theory Of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 32 (1972). Indeed, the risk-
utility approach was invoked to recall custom and hence reduced redistribution. See, e.g., WIi.-
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 131 (1987)
("The adoption of a safety practice by most members of the industry shows that its cost is less
than its expected benefit in accident avoidance; there is no reason for the industry to adopt the
practice otherwise."). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.
469 (1987).
It is accepted that strict products doctrine developed from negligence and, as a result,
"[a]lmost since the [strict liability] rule's inception, courts have tended to borrow common law
concepts of negligence in determining whether a manufactured product, as designed, is unreasona-
bly dangerous." Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1987). Nevertheless, it is
inaccurate to describe the strict liability risk-utility analysis as "the reasonable care balancing
test." Id.
127. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg.. Inc., where the court stated that:
We believe that there is a fundamental difference in the application of a risk/benefit
analysis in a negligent design case and the same analysis in a strict liability design case.
The difference is significant, for it shifts the central focus of the inquiry from the conduct
of the manufacturer (negligence) to the quality of the product (strict liability). Negli-
gence theory concerns itself with determining whether the conduct of the defendant was
reasonable in view of the foreseeable risk of injury; strict liability is concerned with
whether the product itself was unreasonably dangerous.
709 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. 1985); see also Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 474 (Cal. 1988);
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194 (Il1. 1980); St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544
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Conceptually, however, the more important breakthrough, as far
as operational rules for design cases are concerned, was the adoption of
the imputed-foresight rule.128 If the adoption of risk-utility, with its ties
to negligence, guaranteed that there would not be absolute liability, so
the adoption of imputed foresight-a concept antithetical to negli-
gence's actual or constructive rule for risk assessment-guaranteed
equally that design defect cases would not fall back into the clutches of
the negligence allocation model. These constructs continue to dominate
modern design-defect theory and practice.1 29 In short the design-defect
cause of action has both resisted vertical collapse and evolved opera-
tional rules that are distinct and generally resistant to horizontal
collapse.1 30
B. Highly Collapsed Torts
1. Ultrahazardous Activity-Redux
As discussed above, 3' the ultrahazardous activity tort is an exam-
ple of a vertical, fully collapsed tort, in that its allocation model and
operational rules are collapsed into a single, fact-sensitive determina-
tion. Of course, section 520 could have evolved into a more abstract
determinant for the inclusion of fact patterns into a strict liability allo-
cation model. 132 This is apparently the case with the special liability
rule for aircraft-caused ground damage 33 contained in section 520A.'
A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1988); Miles Labs., Inc. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1113 (Md. 1989); Holm v.
Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. 1982); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512
A.2d 466, 472 (N.J. 1986); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 347
(N.D. 1984); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984).
128. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974); see also Dart
v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 880-81 (Ariz. 1985); St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544
A.2d 1283, 1286-88 (Me. 1988) (Glassman, J., dissenting). See generally Terry, supra note 22.
129. See. e.g., In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-58 (D. Haw. 1986)
("state of the art" evidence of the unknowability of a product-related risk at the time of manufac-
ture is irrelevant); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1061-63 (Alaska
1979) (importing negligence concepts into design-defect strict-liability charge warranted reversal);
Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) ("state of the art" evi-
dence not admissible for the purpose of showing whether the seller knew of the dangerousness of
the product); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Wash. 1984) ("state of the art"
evidence of industry custom at the time of manufacture is irrelevant).
130. One of the few windows of potential collapse was in the risk of confusion btween im-
puted foresight of risk and plaintiff's obligation to prove foresight of use. The possibility of confu-
sion was minimized by Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 564 P.2d 674. 675-77 (Or.
1977).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 66-79.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
133. In contrast, say, to injuries suffered by passengers. See generally 3 FOWLER V, HARPER
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Section 520A suffers from a fundamental problem: it was some-
thing of an historical mistake. In spite of its eventual placement as a
coda to the ultrahazardous tort, strict liability for aircraft damage had
its genesis in intentional tort law.135 The clue, of course, is that section
520A liability basically is limited to occasions of aircraft intrusion onto
the property of another; as a child of trespass to land, it does not pro-
vide for general aircraft liability. 1
36
In the early twentieth century, the premodern intentional torts
were struggling to find an identity. At one time the only tort model of
note, the intentional model, was in the process of retrenchment. As
negligence flourished both intellectually and practically in the wake of
high profile cases such as Donoghue v. Stevenson,137 MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.,138 and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,1 39 the
intentional torts were forced to re-group around the concept of deter-
ring socially unacceptable conduct.
Realignment did not proceed without some false steps. Traditional
intentional tort law did not require intent to harm, only an intent to do
the act. 4" A mere entry onto another's land, therefore, involved liabil-
Er AL.. THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.13, at 286-307 (2d ed. 1986).
134. Section 520A provides:
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is caused by the
ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from the
aircraft,
(a) the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the harm, even though he
has exercised the utmost care to prevent it, and
(b) the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he has authorized or
permitted the operation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977).
135. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
88 13, 78, at 78-82, 556-59 (5th ed. 1984); 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 133, § 14.13.
136. See Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978) (doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was applicable in a wrongful death action by plaintiff's decedents, even where some testi-
mony of actual negligence existed); Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1975) (allowing
plaintiff to recover for wrongful death with a res ipsa loquitur ruling against the pilot/owner of a
downed aircraft that arguably crashed as a result of fuel exhaustion).
137. [1932] All E.R. 1 (H.L.).
138. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
139. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
140. The confusion over motive is a result of the Restatement's use of the phrase "intending to
cause a harmful or offensive contact." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1964). The
key to understanding this provision is that "harmful or offensive" objectively qualifies contact, not
intent. See, e.g., Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1951); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d
79 (W. Va. 1991). It provides an objective test for contact, enabling courts to characterize mere
incidental touchings. Cf. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891) (using "implied license"
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ity.141 As such, the nonaccidental entry over land of an airplane, and
any resulting damage seemed suspiciously like a trespass. The famous
case of Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop went further, finding
trespass but justifying that decision with some quaint but nevertheless
contentious allocational language:
If. . . common experience requires the . . . conclusion . . .
that, no matter how perfectly constructed or how carefully
managed an aeroplane may be, it may still fall, then the man
who takes it over another's land and kills his cow or knocks off
his chimney has committed an inexcusable trespass. It must be
kept in mind that, when damage occurs in such a case, one or
the other party has to stand it, and no reason readily suggests
itself why it should not be the one who has brought about the
chance occurrence. . . . To hold that the defendant here is
absolved from liability, because he was himself free from neg-
ligence, is to hazard all the chimneys in the land, as well as
live stock on the farms, and even the people in their homes.
The other alternative seems by far the more reasonable,
namely: Such chance as there may be that a properly
equipped and well-handled aeroplane may still crash upon and
injure private property shall be borne by him who takes the
machine aloft.14 2
This curious admixture of trespass and strict liability led the drafters of
the First Restatement to condemn air transport under both theories.
The trespass theory was effectively gutted by the Second Restate-
characterization for incidental touching). See generally KEErON ET AL, supra note 135, § 13.
141. See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 341 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.
1960) (holding that the cutting by a street paving contractor of a telephone cable lawfully in place
beneath the surface of the ground was a trespass).
The gist of trespass to personalty is an injury to. or interference with, possession, unlaw-
fully, with or without the exercise of physical force.
.... Here, the scraper was deliberately and intentionally used in making a cut to
the designated subgrade. The telephone cable was lawfully in place. The molesting or
severing of the cable was a violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of
action regardless of negligence. The particular appellation or classification to be given the
particular act is not of controlling effect. The important thing is that a property right was
violated.
Id. (citations omitted). This approach was consistent with the very earliest trespass-to-land cases.
See. e.g, Smith v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647) (trespass not committed when defendant
was carried onto land against his will). See generally S.FC. MiLsoM. HIISTORICAL FOuNDATIoNS
OF THE COMMON LAw 253-56 (1969).
142. 266 N.Y.S. 469, 473 (Monroe County Ct. 1933).
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ment. 45 However, the strict liability theory survived into the Second
Restatement as section 520A."' Although continually peppered with
attacks, 4 5 the most interesting commentary on section 520A is pro-
vided by the relatively recent case of Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co.1 40
Crosby was a typical land damage case, an aircraft having crash-
landed on the plaintiff's garage. The majority opinion recognized that
the tide had been turning against the imposition of strict liability for
land damage.117 As to the appropriate allocation model the court
stated:
The causes of aircraft accidents are legion and can come
from a myriad of sources. Every aircraft that flies is at risk
from every bird, projectile and other aircraft. Accidents may
be caused by improper placement of wires or buildings or from
failure to properly mark and light such obstructions. The in-
jury to the ground dweller may have been caused by faulty
engineering, construction, repair, maintenance, metal fatigue,
operation or ground control. Lightning, wind shear and other
acts of God may have brought about a crash. Any listing of
the causes of such accidents undoubtedly would fall short of
the possibilities. In such circumstances the imposition of liabil-
ity should be upon the blameworthy party who can be shown
143. Section 159 provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a trespass may be committed on, beneath, or
above the surface of the-earth.
(2) Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but
only if,
(a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and
(b) it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of his land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1964).
144. See generally 3 HARPER ET AL, supra note 133, § 14.13.
145. See, e.g., Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 223 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961)
("[I]n light of the technical progress achieved in the design, construction, operation and mainte-
nance of aircraft generally, . . . flying should no longer be deemed to be an ultrahazardous activ-
ity, requiring the imposition of absolute liability for any damage or injury caused in the course
thereof.").
146. 746 P.2d 1198 (Wash. 1987).
147. The court noted that:
The number of states imposing strict liability has diminished significantly. At pre-
sent, only six states retain the rule, and even these states apply it only to the owner of the
aircraft . ...
The modern trend followed by a majority of states is to impose liability only upon a
showing of negligence by either the aircraft owner or operator.
Id. at 1200 (citations omitted).
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to be at fault. 4"
Yet, seeking to bolster this argument, the court relied upon the liability
determinants from the (already) collapsed sections 519-520.114 In de-
termining that aircraft-caused land damage was not an ultrahazardous
activity, Crosby succeeded in unraveling the historical confusion of the
previous half-decade. Unfortunately, the technique it chose for this es-
timable task was to recollapse section 520A into sections 519-520, thus
atomizing the section 520A allocation model. 100
2. Unreasonably Dangerous Products
Although the expression "absolute liability" twice escaped Justice
Traynor's lips in Escola,151 contemporary product liability lawyers have
become more sensitive to the distinctions between strict and absolute
liability,152 and have found something of a comfort zone with the for-
mer type of liability. Indeed, and as alluded to above,16 3 little progress
148. Id. at 1201; see also Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n. 821 P.2d 862 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992). Compare the dissenting opinion of Justice Brachtenbach in Crosb). "[l]nnocent per-
sons on the ground are entitled to protection. Who better to provide it than the enterprise for
whose purpose and benefit the danger was created." 746 P.2d at 1208 (Brachtenbach, J.,
dissenting).
149. Concluding that "[a]viation is an activity of 'common usage' it is appropriately con-
ducted over populated areas, and its value to the community outweighs its dangerous attributes.
Indeed, aviation is an integral part of modern society." 746 P.2d at 1201.
150. Justice Brachtenbach noted this unfortunate circumstance in his dissent:
This result ignores the very scheme of these interrelated sections. Section 519 de-
clares the general principle of liability, § 520 lists the factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. Section 520A declares a special rule
to ground damage. What the majority overlooks is that the authors of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in 1977 expressly intended that § 520A stand on its own, I.e., that it in
fact was a special rule, quite distinct from § 520 requirements.
. ..The majority attempts to buttress its result by an analysis of each factor listed
in § 520, finding most to be lacking. Such analysis is irrelevant in light of the language
in the comments and of the history of § 520A.
746 P.2d at 1205-06 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
151. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) ("In my opinion it
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he
has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to human beings.") (emphasis added). See also Id. at 441-42 ("The retailer,
even though not equipped to test a product, is under an absolute liability to his customer, for the
implied warranties of fitness for proposed use and merchantable quality include a warranty of
safety of the product.") (emphasis added).
152. See. e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 845-46 (N.H. 1978) ("Un-
like workmen's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance, strict liability is not a no-fault
system of compensation").
153. See supra note 92.
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has been made toward a product liability allocation model designed to
redistribute a larger number of product-related injuries than the ac-
cepted strict liability system. Although warning cases began to ddvelop
stricter operational rules, the resultant inconsistency with the alloca-
tion model now seems likely to be resolved in favor of reduced, rather
than increased, or "stricter" liability.""
Notwithstanding, some pioneering work has been done on the
"stricter" frontier. Both Maryland and Louisiana developed stricter re-
gimes in the mid-1980s. Although they experimented with ostensibly
different approaches-Maryland appiaring to use a "single product"
(handguns) rule, Louisiana adopting a hybrid category for ultra-dan-
gerous products-both ended in failure. Importantly, these failures can
be blamed in large part on the adoption of collapsed liability models.
The well known Maryland case of Kelley v. R.G. Industries,
Inc.,155 concerned injuries suffered by the plaintiff store-owner when he
was shot by a criminal using a "Saturday Night Special" manufac-
tured and imported by the defendants. The court rejected both the
plaintiff's ultrahazardous activity (marketing the gun)156 and strict
product liability claims.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to develop a novel basis for im-
posing liability, albeit a theory closely related to section 402A. The
court concluded that:
While the fact that a handgun is a Saturday Night Special
may not bring its manufacturer or marketer within any of the
previously existing theories of strict liability . . . . we have
repeatedly pointed out that the common law adapts to fit the
154. See infra text accompanying notes 196-201.
155. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
156. The §§ 519-520 claim was rejected on the basis that "the abnormally dangerous activity
doctrine [does not extend] to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an owner or occupier
of land . . . . The thrust of the doctrine is that the activity be abnormally dangerous in relation to
the area where it occurs." Id. at 1147. This position is consistent with the Second Restatement.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. e (1977). A slightly different way of expres-
sing this limitation on the doctrine is to maintain the distinction between product liability and
ultrahazardous activities. See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th
Cir. 1984) (addressing "the distinction between strict liability for selling unreasonably dangerous
products and strict liability for engaging in ultrahazardous activities by iiaking the sale of a
product an activity[]"). See also Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C. 1989) ("mar-
keting of a handgun not dangerous in and of itself").
157. The court rejected the plaintiff's § 402A claim on the basis that, "regardless of the stan-
dard used to determine whether a product is 'defective' under § 402A, a handgun which functions




needs of society. Consequently, we shall recognize a separate,
limited area of strict liability for the manufacturers, as well
as all in the marketing chain, of Saturday Night Specials.a"
The meta-legal reasoning that the Maryland court found compelling in
endorsing this new allocation model went to both the product and the
producer. As to the former, the court could think of little positive to
say about such a weapon. 159 As to its manufacturer, familiar realloca-
tional language was invoked, as follows:
[T]he manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night Special
knows or ought to know that the chief use of the product is for
criminal activity. Such criminal use, and the virtual absence
of legitimate uses for the product, are clearly foreseeable by
the manufacturers and sellers of Saturday Night Specials.
Moreover, as between the manufacturer or marketer of a
Saturday Night Special, who places among the public a prod-
uct that will be used chiefly in criminal activity, and the inno-
cent victim of such misuse, the former is certainly more at
158. Id. at 1159 (emphasis added); see also Anti-Gun Forces Step Up Effort to Hold Sellers
Liable, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 5, 1991, at A23. See generally Carl T. Bogus, Pistols. Politics and
Products Liability, 59 U. CIN. L REV. 1103 (1991); Patrick S. Davies, Note, Saturday Night
Specials: A "Special" Exception In Strict Liability Law, 61 NOTRtE DAME L REv 478 (1986); H.
Todd Iveson, Note, Manufacturers' Liability To Victims Of Handgun Crime: A Common-Law
Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1983); Rick L. Jett, Note, Do Victilms Of Unlaful Hand-
gun Violence Have A Remedy Against Handgun Manufacturers: An Overview And Analysis,
1985 U. ILL L REV. 967; Matthew S. Steffey, Note, Manufacturers' Or Marketers' Liability For
The Criminal Use Of Saturday Night Specials: A New Common Law Approach-Kelley v. R.G.
Industries, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149 (1986); Susan M. Stevens, Note, Kelley v. R.G Industries.-
When Hard Cases Make Good Law, 46 MD. L REv. 486 (1987).
159. The court stated:
There is, however, a limited category of handguns which clearly is not sanctioned as a
matter of public policy. To impose strict liability upon the manufacturers and marketers
of these handguns, in instances of gunshot wounds caused by criminal use, would not be
contrary to the policy embodied in the enactments of the General Assembly.... [Their]
characteristics render the Saturday Night Special particularly attractive for criminal use
and virtually useless for the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, sport, and protection
of persons, property and businesses .... They are too inaccurate, unreliable and poorly
made for use by law enforcement personnel, sportsmen, homeowners or businessmen
.... The chief "value" a Saturday Night Special handgun has is in criminal activity,
because of its easy concealability and low price. Obviously, the use of a handgun in the
commission of a crime is not a "legitimate" use justified by State policy. To the contrary,
the Legislature has expressly declared that the criminal use of a handgun is a separate
crime that carries a mandatory sentence of not less than five years imprisonment.
497 A.2d at 1153-58.
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fault than the latter.1 60
Note that the court itself labels this model as one of strict liability 1 '
and recognizes its novel character. However, what fact patterns are to
be associated with this model? Reminiscent of sections 519-520, the
approach is fatally collapsed, in that the allocation is made on a case-
by-case basis rather than in more abstract or general terms.
Kelley gives every indication that it is a single-product rule, in that
the only fact pattern that the court has considered for this allocation
model involves criminal use of handguns. However, the court did not
say anything that would close off the later expansion of liability to
other fact patterns.16 2
The only doctrinal specifics in which the court would indulge were
some operational considerations for identifying the guns that would fall
under the stricter regime-characteristics such as low quality and fed-
eral proscription. 6 3 Although apparently designed for case-by-case im-
plementation, these are not operational rules in the sense used herein.
Rather, they are highly specific tools for allocating the fact pattern to
the new allocation model. Although more traditional second-order oper-
ational rules were to apply to plaintiff misconduct, 64 the court limited
its fact-pattern identification to the following:
[O]nce the trier of facts determines that a handgun is a Satur-
day Night Special, then liability may be imposed against a
manufacturer or anyone else in the marketing chain, including
the retailer. Liability may only be imposed, however, when the
plaintiff or plaintiff's decedent suffers injury or death because
he is shot with the Saturday Night Special. In addition, the
shooting must be a criminal act. The shooting itself may be
160. Id. at 1159 (citations omitted).
161. Id. The court's apparent adoption of the 'imputed foresight' strict liability operational
rule also is significant.
162. Recall the growth of inherently dangerous product subcategories in both the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, functioning as doctrinal development tools. See supra text accompanying
notes 98-110.
163. 497 A.2d at 1160.
164. The court stated:
Although neither contributory negligence nor assumption of the risk will be recognized as
defenses, nevertheless the plaintiff must not be a participant in the criminal activity. If
the foregoing elements are satisfied, then the defendant shall be liable for all resulting




the sole criminal act, or it may occur in the course of another
crime where the person firing the Saturday Night Special is
one of the perpetrators of the crime." 5
Kelley was not warmly received in its own16  or other jurisdic-
tions.1617 Most critiques have focused on the apparent absence of the
requirement to prove a factual defect-a first-order operational rule in
products cases. Typical of the critical jurisprudence is Diggles v. Hor-
witz. 168 A patient at a mental health facility committed suicide by
shooting himself with the semi-automatic pistol he had just purchased
at a pawn shop. While the court did not rule out the possibility of a
negligence action against the owner of the pawn shop, it held that
neither strict product liability nor ultrahazardous activity action would
lie against the retailer or the manufacturer of the gun. In the words of
the perceptive concurrence, "[u]nder present decisional precedents in
our State, there cannot be a recovery based on products liability...
unless the product, itself, contains a defect. '"1 6 D In other words, the
product worked all too well.
As can be seen from Diggles, the inability to demonstrate a fac-
tual defect provides a facially reasonable argument for denying claims
against products that are intentionally (guns) or inevitably (cigarettes,
alcohol) dangerous. Yet, the argument presupposes limiting our defect
characterization to a warranty-inspired "does not work" approach. An
alternate characterization might be that these products indeed do have
a defect: their inherent and identifiable dangerousness. In other words,
are courts that assert that the plaintiff failed to identify a factual de-
fect in the product making a factual determination from the record or
a normative judgment that such dangerousness cannot constitute a de-
fect? If courts are favoring a "lack of factual defect" argument, are
165. Id.
166. A subsequently enacted Maryland statute provides:
A person or entity may not be held strictly liable for damages or any kind resulting from
injuries to another person sustained as a result of the criminal use or any firearm by a
third person, unless the person or entity conspired with the third person to commit, or
willfully aided, abetted, or caused the commission of. the criminal act in which the fire-
arm was used.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-I(h)(1) (1992).
167. See, e.g., Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); King v. R.G.
Indus., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); Robertson v.
Grogan Inv. Co., 710 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
168. 765 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
169. Id. at 843 (Brookshire, J., concurring).
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they trying to avoid the complexities of the legal defectiveness issue in
such cases? After all, any frontal assault on such a product involves a
fundamental reformulation of our risk-utility approach to design de-
fects. For example, plaintiff would be arguing that, notwithstanding the
lack of any alternate design or manufacture, the product's dangerous-
ness, although adequately warned against, outweighs its utility. Under
this approach, our hypothetical reasonable manufacturer equipped with
perfect information would conclude that the product should not be pro-
duced at all.7 0
Notwithstanding, the more fundamental objection is Kelley's fatal
vertical collapse, the uncertainty as to what weapons would fit within
the liability model. In the words of one court:
[C]reation of such a doctrine is extremely problematic insofar
as which manufacturers would be held liable. All firearms are
capable of being used for criminal activity. Merely to impose
liability upon the manufacturers of the cheapest types of
handguns will not avoid that basic fact. Instead, claims
against gun manufacturers will have the anomalous result that
only persons shot with cheap guns will be able to recover,
while those shot with expensive guns, admitted by the Kelley
court to be more accurate and therefore deadlier, would take
nothing.17 1
Kelley aside, the only explicit attempt to develop an overtly
17 2
170. Such a position runs counter to the Second Restatement, which states:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food
or drug necessarily involves some risk or harm, if only from over-consumption . . . The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics. . . . Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something
like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably danger-
ous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to
heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably
dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
171. Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d 406
(10th Cir. 1988); accord, Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761-62 (D.C. 1989).
172. Some jurisdictions have developed a stricter form of liability by radicalizing their opera-
tional rules. Take, for example, the statement, "liability may be imposed without regard to the
defendant's knowledge or conduct." Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371,
383 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), rev'd in part by Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.764 (1988). Applied literally,
such a rule has a profound impact on the scope of liability. For example, by denying a manufac-
turer the opportunity to contend that there was no feasible alternative design available, the scope
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stricter allocation model for product liability cases has been in Louisi-
ana. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.173 recognized a novel cat-
egory of defect allegation, and thereby a category of product that was
"unreasonably dangerous per se." This not only placed Louisiana in the
forefront of those jurisdictions taking a "stricter" approach to strict
product liability, 174 but also melded civilian principles 1"5 with the com-
of liability would seem more in keeping with absolute liability. See generally Terry, supra note 42,
at 30-37.
Liability systems also may be made "stricter" in other ways. For example, a jurisdiction
might choose to modify the burden of proof on causation. In a complex s)stem such as modem
products liability, changes in what appear to be relatively minor operational rules may have dra-
matic ramifications. Such has been the case with the admissibility of various types of evidence
which, unfortunately, have been referred to by the single, collective description of "state of the
art." See generally Terry, supra note 22. Of course, when the adoption of a liability rule has as
profound effect on the scope of liability as some state-of-the-art rules have, there is a real danger
that the rule of operation will cease to be consistent with the theory. When this occurs, it may be
necessary to relabel the theory of liability itself for purposes of clarity.
173. 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986), answer conformed to 788 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1986).
modified in part by Louisiana Products Liability Act of 1988, LA. REV STAT ANN § 9-2800-31 -
.59 (West 1991). See generally William E. Crawford, Torts: Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp.-Products Liability Rewritten, 47 LA. L REv. 485 (1986); William E. Crawford, Note,
Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.-A New Product In the Area of Products Liability. 47
LA. L. REV. 637 (1987).
174. See generally Terry, supra note 42.
175. Specifically, the Louisiana Civil Code provides, "We arc responsible, not only for the
damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom
we are answerable, or of the things which we have In our custody.L. .& I. Civ CODE AN ,.
art. 2317 (West 1973) (emphasis added). Thus, Halphen concluded:
The principle of strict products liability is analogous to the principle of legal fault or
strict liability underlying civil code articles 2317-22. The manufacturer who places an
unreasonably dangerous product on the market that causes injury to innocent victims is
subject to strict liability even if he has not been guilty of any negligence. The liability
arises from his legal relationship to the product and is based on the product's unreasona-
bly dangerous condition. One of the reasons for strict products liability is similar to that
underlying the codal strict liability: The person to whom society allots the supervision.
care, or guardianship (custody) of the risk-creating thing bears the loss resulting from
creation of the risk, rather than some innocent third person harmed as a consequence of
its defective condition.
484 So. 2d at 116-17; see also Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971).
overruled by Dorry v. Lafleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981); Loescher v. Parr. 324 So. 2d 441 (La.
1975); Palmer, supra note 21, at 1334-54. See generally J. CALAMS-AULOy. CONSUMER LEGISLA-
TION IN FRANCE 28-29 (1981).
Louisiana's products doctrine had been influenced from the start by codal principles. See.
e.g., Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 170-71 (La.), answer conformed to 755 F.2d 1146
(5th Cir. 1985). The Bell court stated:
Our products liability rule is consistent with the Code's underlying reasons for imposing a
legal obligation when a quasi-offense causes damage to another: there is alwms, either in
the person of the creditor or in his patrimony, a circumstance which renders such crea-
tion necessary, and such circumstance is nothing other than the unjust injury which must
1993]
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mon law of product liability for the first time.17
Halphen described its novel category of product liability allega-
tion, the classification of a product as "unreasonably dangerous per se,"
as follows:
For products in this category liability may be imposed solely
on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the product irre-
spective of the manufacturer's intent, knowledge or conduct.
This category should be acknowledged as giving rise to the
purest form of strict liability and clearly distinguished from
other theories in which the manufacturer's knowledge or con-
duct is an issue.
A product is unreasonably dangerous per se if a reasona-
ble person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the prod-
uct, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the
product. This theory considers the product's danger-in-fact,
not whether the manufacturer perceived or could have per-
ceived the danger, because the theory's purpose is to evaluate
the product itself, not the manufacturer's conduct. Likewise,
the benefits are those actually found to flow from the use of
the product, rather than as perceived at the time the product
was designed and marketed.7
As with Kelley, this new form of liability is vertically collapsed.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana did hint at a stricter allocation model,
implying that its per se characterization would involve the redistribu-
tion of more product-related injuries than under conventional strict
products liability71 or, a fortiori, under negligence. However, Halphen
failed to define the fact pattern to which this increased redistribution
would apply. Further, and similarly characteristic of vertical collapse,
Halphen failed to provide any doctrinal mechanism to control case-by-
be avoided, if it has not yet occurred, or to repair it, if it has already happened.
462 So. 2d at 170-71.
176. Even European federal product liability law seems to owe more to American common law
than civilian law. See, e.g., 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (utilizing a consumer-expectations type test for
liability); see also Joseph W. Little, Rationalization of the Law of Product Liability, 36 U. FLA.
L. REv. 1 (1984).
177. 484 So. 2d at 113-14 (citations omitted).
178. Note that Louisiana courts have consistently distinguished between absolute liability and
liability posited on article 2317 of the Civil Code. See. e.g., Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146,
1151 (La. 1983) (Lemmon, J., concurring); Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 501
(La. 1982) (Dennis, J., concurring); Buckbee v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 542 So. 2d 81, 84-85
(La. Ct. App. 1989), cert. granted, 590 So. 2d 580 (La. 1992).
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case redistribution. 7 9
While it seems likely that Halphen intended to redistribute more
risks associated with "unreasonably dangerous per se" products than
other products presumably controlled by the traditional defect allega-
tions, we are told neither the identity of the products that fit within this
special category, nor which of the risks associated with such products
will be redistributed.18 0 Collapsing the operational rules and allocation
model in this fashion provides for an unsatisfactory liability model. Be-
cause manufacturers are unable to make any liability projections, the
system is dramatically robbed of its deterrence potential. Moreover, the
increased information costs inherent in a case-by-case determination of
product exposure would create inefficiencies in the insurance market. 81
What lies at the foundation of Halphen's "unreasonably danger-
ous per se" characterization is a judicial conclusion that some products
179. Compare Justice Dennis' concurrence in Kent:
In strict liability, except for the element of the dcfendant's knowledge, the test is the
same as that for negligence. In negligence, allowance is made for the risk apparent to the
actor, for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under which he must act. In
strict liability, however, knowledge of the condition of the product is imputed to the de-
fendant before the balancing test or negligence test is applied. In products liability, for
example, a product is considered unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would
not sell the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a
reasonable buyer would expect. Thus, assuming that the defendant had knowledge of the
condition of the product, would he then have been acting unreasonably in placing it on
the market? This is another way of posing the question of whether the product presents
an unreasonable risk of injury. And it may be the most useful way of presenting it.
Kent, 418 So. 2d at 501 (Dennis, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
180. The confusion is highlighted by the Halphen court's admission that the "unreasonably
dangerous per se" category was identical with one of the sub-types of its design defect cases: -A
product may be unreasonably dangerous because of its design for any one of three reasons: (1) A
reasonable person would conclude that the danger in fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs
the utility of the product. This is the same danger-utility test applied in determining whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous per se." 484 So. 2d at 115 (citations omitted).
181. This critique of Halphen should not be taken simply as directed against increased redis-
tribution of product-related injuries. Indeed, Louisiana adopted such an example of almost abso-
lute liability with regard to exploding bottles in Robertson v. Gulf South Beverage, Inc., 421 So.
2d 877 (La. 1982). Cf. Lescale v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Ltd., 422 So. 2d 241 (La.
Ct. App. 1982) (affirming damages awarded for cuts sustained opening a can of soda). Whether
or not that rule is valid on efficiency or deterrence grounds, it is logically supportable and is
exempt from the critique visited upon Halphen. This is because Robertson both defined the fact
pattern that was to be subjected to increased redistribution (exploding bottles), and provided the
distributional test to be applied on a case-by-case basis, as follows:
[W]e find it unnecessary to decide whether the bottle exploded spontaneously or whether
it exploded when struck. We do not hold that a person may never be barred from recov-
ery by striking or dropping a bottle with a force sufficient to cause it to explode. The
inquiry. in such cases, would always be whether the bottle was In normal use.
421 So. 2d at 879 (emphasis added).
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fail the risk-utility test so badly that they should not be marketed even
with a warning. This stricter form of liability was distinguished by two
significant modifications to Louisiana's products doctrine. First,
Halphen's danger-utility test was very different from those used in
products liability cases in other jurisdictions.18' Halphen's danger-
utility test was just that-a direct computation involving the product's
actual danger and actual utility. The feasibility and availability of al-
ternate products or designs were not in issue.1 13
The vertically collapsed Halphen left undefined the products that
are "unreasonably dangerous per se." One starting point should have
been the Halphen product-asbestos. However, the court did not spe-
cifically announce that asbestos was an "unreasonably dangerous per
se" product."" Of course, legislation8 5 brought the category to an un-
timely end before courts could work out effective operational rules.
However, even traditional casuistic development seemed uncomfortable
with the unreasonably dangerous characterization.'"6
182. See Halpen, 484 So. 2d at 114 n.2.
183. Cf. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). The Wilson court de-
scribed the role of the court:
[T]he court is to determine, and to weigh in the balance, whether the proposed alterna-
tive design has been shown to be practicable. The trial court should not permit an allega-
tion of design defect to go to the jury unless there is sufficient evidence upon which to
make this determination.
Id. at 1326. See also Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 507 So. 2d 809, 815-16 (La. 1987) (noting
that if the utility of the product does outweigh danger (i.e., the product is not "unreasonably
dangerous per se") the product may still be unreasonably dangerous if there is a feasible alterna-
tive design).
184. Notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seemed to harbor few reser-
vations as to the implications of the discussion in Halphen. As the Fifth Circuit noted: "We claim
no prescience as to the universe of products which ultimately will be given the cognomen 'unrea-
sonably dangerous per se,' but we find it apparent from the citations and discussion in the certifi-
cation response that the Supreme Court of Louisiana places asbestos in that category." Haiphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 788 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1986).
185. Louisiana Products Liability Act of 1988, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.54 (West
1991). However, see Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991), in which
Justice Dennis, author of the Halphen opinion, concurred but preferred "not to express an opinion
as to whether the risks or utility of tobacco use are enormous or nil. Also, strictly speaking, the
Legislature may repeal or change law but it cannot overrule or reverse decisions of the courts
interpreting the law." Id. at 1266 (Dennis, J., concurring).
186. The following cases resisted the per se characterization: Willett v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 929
F.2d 1094, 1097 (5th Cir. 1991) (pyrolitic carbon heart valves); Miles v. Olin Corp., 922 F.2d
1221, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 1991) (Winchester model 37 single-shot shotgun); Valenti v. Surgitek-
Flash Medical Eng'r Corp., 875 F.2d 466, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1989) (penile prosthesis); Williams v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573, 577 (W.D. La. 1988) (prescription drug); Brown v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 514 So. 2d 439, 442 (La. 1987) (escalator); Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600
So. 2d 701, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (aspirin). Cf. McCoy v. Otis Elevator Co., 546 So. 2d 229,
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Halphen itself favored an open risk-utility analysis. 1 7 However, in
the words of one court,
[I] t is presumptively inappropriate for a jury to apply the pure
risk-utility test of "unreasonably dangerous per se" to a
known and warned-of risk of a prescription drug. Such risks
have already been considered in the arduous risk-utility scru-
tiny of the expert Food and Drug Administration's approval
procedures. The plaintiff desirous of having such a risk sub-
mitted to a jury must affirmatively show the propriety of the
court's so doing. Rather than simply permitting juries to ap-
ply, haphazardly and case-by-case, the risk-utility test when-
ever harm results, the court must require, as a part of the
plaintiff's burden of producing evidence, an articulable basis
for disregarding the FDA's determination that the drug
should be available. 88
As with Kelley's "Saturday Night Special," the obvious objection once
again is plaintiff's failure to identify a factual defect. The generally
unsuccessful counter is that the defendant's product should be judged
by a "pure" risk-utility analysis, where the product, rather than its fac-
tually identified defect, is subjected to the analysis.188
The Second Restatement suggests another major weakness in such
cases-the obviousness of the danger.8 0 However, a frontal attack has
been mounted on the Restatement's position in cigarette cases. 19
230-31 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (freight elevator unreasonably dangerous per se).
187. See supra text accompanying note 177.
188. Williams, 686 F. Supp. at 577.
189. See, e.g., Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 727 P.2d 655, 660-61 (Wash. 1986) (chil-
dren riding mini-trailbike on public roadway).
190. Comment j to § 402A states that:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may
be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use . . . .But a
seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which are
oily dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long
period of time, when the danger or potentiality of danger, is generally known and
recognized.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. j (1965) (citing the "dangers of alcoholic be er-
ages" as an example).
191. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (NJ. 1990) (rejecting
"good tobacco" argument). See also Mary Griffen, Note, The Smoldering Issue In Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc- Process Concerns In Determining Whether Cigarettes Are A Defectively
Designed Product, 73 CORNELL L REV. 606 (1988). See generally Robert L. Rabin, A Sociologi-
cal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L REV. 853 (1992); Frank J. Vandall,
Reallocating the Costs of Smoking. The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette bfanufac-
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While Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.192 decided that some state
failure-to-warn causes of action are preempted by the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act, the Court did not address any
broader attack based on a dangerous per se characterization.1 93 A simi-
lar debate is shaping up in the case of manufacturer liability for selling
alcohol."9 Again, the doctrinal focus tends to be on the manufacturer's
duty to warn of, what are argued to be, non-obvious risks. Equally, the
waters are muddied by federal legislation and preemption argu-
ments.195 The reality of the litigation, however, is a focus on a product
turers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405 (1991).
192. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). Cipollone concerned state damage claims for breach of express
warranty, failure to warn, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy. The manufacturer argued pre-
emption based on the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282, and the 1969 amendment to Act, Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988)). The Court
was unanimous in holding that § 5 of the 1965 Act did not preempt the state damage actions. Id.
at 2622-23. However, there was less unanimity regarding the more generally worded § 5(b) of the
1969 Act. Justices Scalia and Thomas considered that all of the petitioner's claims were pre-
empted. Id. at 2637 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter considered that none of the claims were preempted. Id. at
2626 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part). The key opinion was that of Justice Stevens, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and O'Connor, holding that § 5(b) preempted the petitioner's failure to warn
theories and the allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation relating to attempting to neutralize the
federally mandated warnings. However, the express warranty claims, a more broadly stated fraud-
ulent misrepresentation/disclosure allegation, and the conspiracy claim survived the preemption
argument. Id. at 2619-22. Cipollone was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff on November 5,
1992, reportedly because of the pressure of mounting costs on the law firm representing the
plaintiff.
193. Not surprisingly, given its per se rule, Louisiana has seen its share of cigarette cases. See,
e.g., Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling Act did not preempt plaintiff's per se claim, but declining to rule whether
cigarettes were per se unreasonably dangerous); Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 572 So. 2d 289,
291-92 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that, as a matter of law, cigarettes are not unreasonably danger-
ous per se and affirming summary judgment for cigarette manufacturers), rev'd, 582 So. 2d 1263,
1264 (La. 1991) ("Since normal use of cigarettes causes lung cancer, the risk of smoking ciga-
rettes is enormous, while its utility is virtually nil. . . .Using Halphen's risk/utility test, a jury
must determine whether cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se.").
194. See Natalie K. Chetlin, Comment, In support of Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.: A Brewing
Debate Over Extending Liability To Manufacturers of Alcoholic Beverages, 51 U. PITr, L. REV.
179 (1989). See also Gina M. DeDominicis, Note, No Duty At Any Speed?: Determining The
Responsibility Of The Automobile Manufacturer In Speed-Related Accidents, 14 Ho'sTRA L.
REV. 403 (1986). See generally James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing The American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection Of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263
(1991).
195. In 1988 Congress passed the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1988), which mandates that all alcoholic beverages manufactured, imported, or bottled for sale
or distribution in the U.S. to carry the following label: "GOVERNMENT WARNING: (1) Ac-
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as having potential for liability because of its "non-defective" yet inher-
ent dangerousness,1 96 a riddle that is denied solution in the vertically
collapsed approaches suggested so far.
3. Product Liability Warning Cases
Occasionally a court will use the collapse technique as part of a
broader strategy concerning the structure of a cause of action. A prime
example is a tactic employed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
the well known case of Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp."°
Recall that most jurisdictions, albeit with varying levels of candor,
have adopted a risk-utility test for legal defectiveness in product liabil-
ity design cases. The use of this test is consistent with a strict liability
allocation model; some products will pass the test, but fewer than in
negligence.195 Another important operational rule in design cases is im-
puted foresight. The core of negligence liability is the unreasonable
running of a foreseeable risk.19 9 Thus, the requirement of actual or con-
cording to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy
because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to
drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause health problems:' 27 U.S.C. § 215.
Section 216 of the Act contains preemptive language which may preclude state law chal-
lenges to a manufactures duty to warn. See Carter H. Dukes, Alcohol Manufacturers and The
Duty To Warn: An Analysis of Recent Case Law in Light of The Alcoholic Beverage Labeling
Act of 1988, 38 EmORY. LJ. 1189, 1206-12 (1989) (discussing preemption and drawing an anal-
ogy to the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965): see also Sheila L Birnbaum & Gary
E. Crawford, How Cipollone Affects Other Industries, NAT't. L, Aug. 24. 1992 at 20, 22.
196. See Northern Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1992)
(fetal alcohol syndrome due to drinking during pregnancy), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3033 (1992)
(suit subsequently voluntarily dismissed); Debra C. Moss, Parents Sue Liquor Companies, ABA
J, Mar. 1, 1989, at 17. Cf. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510. 514 (3d Cir. 1987) (pan-
creatitis from moderate and prolonged beer consumption a risk not known to consumer or consum-
ing public); Smith v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 599 A.2d 320 (R.I. 1991) (action against brewer
alleging that defendant's advertising encouraged driving while intoxicated dismissed); Schmidt v.
Centex Beverage, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (action against distributor by tres-
passer injured by intoxicated volunteers at music festival dismissed because distributor owed no
duty to trespasser); Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(refusing to rule that "the general public is aware that the consumption of an excessive amount of
alcohol can result in death," thus precluding summary judgment in tequila overdose case, with a
resulting S1.5 million jury verdict, see WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1992, at B8). See generally Garrison
v. Heublin, Inc., 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982) (risk of injuries associated with alcoholism is
common knowledge such that alcohol is not unreasonably dangerous); Maguire v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Iowa 1986) (risk of intoxication sufficiently known to consumers at
large); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991) (danger of
developing alcoholism within ordinary knowledge common to the general community).
197. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
199. See, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. Ch.
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structive foresight of risk is an explicit component of negligence-based
products liability.200 However, in strict liability design cases, producer
foresight has been replaced with a conclusive presumption that the
manufacturer knew of the risks associated with its product (imputed
foresight) 201
While design-defect jurisprudence carefully moved down an uncol-
lapsed path, product liability warning cases faced a much more uncer-
tain future.20 2 Courts seemed to have difficulty agreeing on any opera-
tional rule in warning cases other than negligence-based "adequacy.1 203
Indeed, there was little agreement whether the strict liability allocation
model extended to warning cases.2 04 By the early 1980s, two crucial
decisions had to be made concerning the warning cause of action: first,
whether foresight was to be imputed and, second, whether the ade-
quacy test for defectiveness was to be conduct oriented or product ori-
ented. The need to determine both issues was driven by questions relat-
ing to the admissibility of certain state-of-the-art evidence. 20 1
Beshada was one of the first cases to openly confront these issues.
Unfortunately, it did not so much confront as collapse them. The court
began by noting that "[w]hen plaintiffs urge that a product is hazard-
ous because it lacks a warning, they . . .[say] in effect that regardless
of the overall cost-benefit calculation the product is unsafe because a
warning could make it safer at virtually no added cost and without
limiting its utility. 206  Then, led by a defense argument that
unknowability is relevant to the adequacy determination,2 07 the court
1856) (water company not negligent for failing to foresee and prevent water main accident "the
cause of which was so obscure that it was not discovered until many months after the accident had
occurred[]"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965).
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toas § 395 (1965).
201. See, e.g., Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 n.4 (Mo. 1986);
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 1974). This is distinct from the
issue of foresight of use. See. e.g., Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 564 P.2d 674, 675-77
(Or. 1977).
202. See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8; Terry, supra note 22, at 298-307.
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). See, e.g., Crislip v. TCH
Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1182-83 (Ohio 1990).
204. Cf. Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 594 P.2d 911, 914 (Wash. 1979) (applying strict liability).
205. An imputed-foresight rule renders irrelevant defensive evidence of an absence of industry
knowledge of a risk. A product-oriented adequacy rule renders irrelevant defensive evidence of
industry custom. See generally Terry, supra note 22, at 290-91.
206. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 1982).
207. Id. at 546 ("Defendants conceptualize the scientific unknowability of the dangerous





When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose a
duty on them to warn of the unknowable, they misconstrue
both the purpose and effect of strict liability. By imposing
strict liability, we are not requiring defendants to have done
something that is impossible. In this sense, the phrase "duty to
warn" is misleading. It implies negligence concepts with their
attendant focus on the reasonableness of defendant's behavior.
However, a major concern of strict liability-ignored by de-
fendants-is the conclusion that if a product was in fact de-
fective, the distributor of the product should compensate its
victims for the misfortune that it inflicted on them. 08
Beshada's virtual collapse of adequacy and imputed foresight was pur-
poseful. Against the collapsed operational rules, defendant's arguments
were easily characterizeable as endorsing a wholesale return to negli-
gence principles, a position that Beshada clearly could reject. However,
in horizontally collapsing warning doctrine, Beshada set a trap for it-
self. If arguing against the collapsed operational rules exposed defend-
ants to accusations of favoring a negligence allocation model, then
those collapsed rules could themselves be attacked as being more con-
sistent with an absolute, rather than a strict, liability model.
At this point three potential routes open up. First, the courts could
recognize that indeed some form of stricter liability should be contem-
plated for a limited number of ultra-dangerous prodt cts.20 9 Second, the
courts could uncollapse the operational rules in warning cases, main-
taining imputed foresight, but designing real content into "adequacy,"
thus reducing the number of redistributions to a level consistent with a
strict liability model.2 10 Third, courts could come to view Beshada's
operational rules as unjustifiably involving absolute liability and, be-
cause of the trap set in Beshada, incapable of uncollapsed reform. This
third position would result in a judicial abandonment of a strict liabil-
ity allocation model for warning cases in favor of a negligence-based
allocation model. Recent cases suggest that this particular trap, which
Beshada set for itself, is now being sprung. 1
208. Id. at 546.
209. Indeed, the next major New Jersey case, Feldman v. Lederle Labs.. 479 A.2d 374 (NJ.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 592 A.2d 1176 (N.J. 1991), left open such a possibility when it
restricted Beshada to its own facts-asbestos. Id. at 387-88.
210. See Terry, supra note 22, at 301.
211. See. e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549. 553-60 (Cal.
1993]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
C. Partially Collapsed Torts
Fully collapsed torts such as ultrahazardous activity are the excep-
tion rather than the rule. More prevalent are partially collapsed torts,
typically exhibiting a horizontal collapse.
1. Negligence Per Se
The statutory violation (negligence per se) case frequently is con-
sidered one of the simplest types of negligence cases. The basic premise
of negligence per se is that the breach of some criminal or regulatory
norm may be an appropriate substitute for other first-order approaches
to the standard of care.212 As is well known, there are three basic types
of regulatory statutes (or standards): 213 first, statutes that explicitly
add civil consequences to their primary criminal or administrative pen-
alties;214 second, statutes that explicitly prohibit215 or limit216 civil con-
sequences flowing from breach of the statute; and, third, statutes that
are silent on the issue. Negligence per se doctrine concerns only the
third category of statutes. 17
1991) (discussing failure-to-warn theory of strict liability). See generally Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 8.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965), providing, "it]he standard of con-
duct of a reasonable man may be . . . (b) adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or
an administrative regulation which does not so provide" (emphasis added); cf French v. Will-
man, 599 A.2d 1151, 1152 (Me. 1991) (Maine does not recognize negligence per se). "The pre-
sent rule in Maine is 'that violation of a safety statute is not negligence per se, but only evidence
of negligence.'" Id. (quoting Dongo v. Banks 448 A.2d 885, 889 (Me. 1982)).
213. See generally Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A Statutory/Common
Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REV. 781 (1990).
214. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988) (civil suit for breach
of consumer safety regulations); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101(1) (McKinney 1978) (civil
dram shop action).
215. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.1 (West 1989) (breach of seatbelt statute is not
contributory negligence).
216. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178.3(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (breach of scatbelt stat-
ute shall not operate to reduce damages by more than one percent).
217. Of course, even when a court holds a statute not to have per se effects, the breach of the
statute will still constitute relevant evidence of uncollapsed negligence. See, e.g., the Illinois su-
preme court's statement in Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos.:
A violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human life or property is prima
facie evidence of negligence. A party injured by such a violation may recover only by
showing that the violation proximately caused his injury and the statute or ordinance was
intended to protect a class of persons to which he belongs from the kind of injury that he
suffered. The violation does not constitute negligence per se, however, and therefore the
defendant may prevail by showing that he acted reasonably under the circumstances.




The question is how we identify statutes that have per se applica-
bility. The classic doctrinal exposition is contained in Osborne v. Mc-
Masters ,218 a case imposing liability on a pharmacist for supplying
plaintiff's decedent with unlabelled poison, in violation of a state stat-
ute. For the Osborne court, the issue was quite uncomplicated:
It is now well settled, certainly in this state, that where a stat-
ute or municipal ordinance imposes upon any person a specific
duty for the protection or benefit of others, if he neglects to
perform that duty he is liable to those for whose protection or
benefit it was imposed for any injuries of the character which
the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent, and which
were proximately produced by such neglect.210
Ever eager to endorse the facile, the Second Restatement chimes in
with the following:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasona-
ble man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an ad-
ministrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclu-
sively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one
whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded,
and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm
which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard
from which the harm results.220
Obviously, these statements of the law are impossibly conclusory. They
inform us of none of the criteria that distinguish the statutes that do
protect the plaintiff or her interests in a particular case from those that
do not.21
218. 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889).
219. Id. at 543.
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
221. Notwithstanding, the Osborne-Restatement position is still given currency. See. e.g.,
Newport v. Moran, 721 P.2d 465, 467 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) ("Violation of an ordinance may be
negligence per se if the violation is the cause of the injury, the plaintiff is within the class of
persons intended to be protected by the legislation and the injury is within the area of risk in-
tended to be avoided by the ordinance.") (citing Smith v. Portland Traction Co.. 359 P.2d 899.
901 (Or. 1961)). See also Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 33, (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that
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The starting point for unraveling the negligence per se doctrine is
to question what a plaintiff gains by arguing per se rather than "ordi-
nary" negligence. Assume that a plaintiff is granted a per se instruc-
tion. What does the plaintiff still have to prove?
The answer is that the plaintiff only has to prove "breach" of the
statute and cause in fact.22 In this context, "breach" refers to the tech-
nical or factual part of breach-for example, whether the defendant
sold the alcohol to a minor or whether the defendant left his automo-
bile unlocked with the keys in the ignition. Crucially, breach here does
not refer to the normative or standard-setting aspects of breach (here-
inafter referred to as "normative breach" 22 )-for example, whether
selling the alcohol or leaving the keys is "wrong" or "negligent." ' 22'
If plaintiff has to prove only technical breach and cause in fact, it
follows that a per se characterization of a statute is a conclusion that
no standard of care was imposed either by statute or by defendant's handbook and that defendant
had no duty either to protect or warn the surrounding community of the high-risk teenagers en-
rolled in defendant's job corps), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938
(1983); Good v. City of Glendale, 722 P.2d 386, 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that plain-
tiff's negligent conduct did not cause the police to shoot him and stating that "[t]he purpose of the
criminal statutes in question is to protect the police, as members of the public, from harm, not to
protect the plaintiff, the alleged violator of the law, from harm ... [but,] the violation of the
enactment will not be negligence unless the harm which the violation causes is that from which it
was the purpose of the enactment to protect the other[]" (citations omitted)); Schlobohm v.
United Parcel Serv., 804 P.2d 978, 982 (Kan. 1991) (holding that plaintiff was a member of the
class of persons the code was designed to protect-"those persons . . . who enter and exit door-
ways"); Kansas State Bank v. Specialized Transp. Servs., 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991) (child abuse
reporting statute was for benefit of public as a whole, not discrete class of abused children,
(" 'Statutes. . .enacted to protect the public. . . do not create a duty to individuals injured as a
result of the statutory violation.'" (quoting Schlobohm, 804 P.2d at 981)); Lynn v. Overlook
Dev., 403 S.E.2d 469 (N.C. 1991) (building code protects public at large, not particular purchas-
ers); Whitlaw v. Kroger Co., 410 S.E.2d 251 (S.C. 1991) (declining "to extend the class of per-
sons the statute is intended to protect to all persons to whom the purchasing minor may give or
sell the alcohol[]") (plaintiff's son, killed when his car struck a tree, consumed alcohol provided to
him by a third party, an "underage youth," who had purchased the beer at the defendant's place
of business).
222. "As a general rule of statutory construction, a statute enacted for the safety and protec-
tion of the public can impose a specific requirement to do or not to do a particular act. . . .A
violation of the former type constitutes negligence per se." Becker v. Shaull, 584 N.E.2d 684, 685-
86 (Ohio 1992). Thus, the only factual determination for the jury is the commission or omission of
the act prohibited or required. See Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 119 N.E.2d 440, 444 (Ohio 1954)
("by finding a single issue of fact").
223. Normative breach as used herein refers to two basic elements of "breach" or "standard
of care": (1) constructive risk-assessment; and (2) the applicable level of standard of care applied
to this fact pattern.
224. Whitlaw v. Kroger Co., 410 S.E.2d 251, 252 (S.C. 1991) (holding that if plaintiff then
shows that the defendant violated that statute, he has proven the second element of a negligence
cause of action, viz., that the defendant, by act or omission, failed to exercise due care).
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the other elements of the traditional negligence prima facie case are
satisfied. That is, when a judge characterizes a statute as having per se
effects, she has actually determined the issues of duty, normative
breach (risk identification and standard setting), and legal cause. 2 5 It
follows that, other than for some basic fact finding, negligence per se is
a collapsed version of the negligence tort.226 This is a horizontal col-
lapse, in which the three operational rules (duty, normative breach, and
legal cause) have been collapsed into a single inquiry.227
Well known negligence per se cases support this conclusion. For
example, in Ross v. Hartman the court referred to the defendant's con-
duct as follows: "This negligence created the hazard and thereby
brought about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent.
It was therefore a legal or 'proximate' cause of the harm. 228 Similarly,
the courts have confirmed that even with a statute having per se appli-
cation, the plaintiff must prove factual causation.2 29
225. Cf Walter Probert, Causation in the Negligence Jargon: A Plea for Balanced Realism,
18 U. FLA. L. REv. 369, 379-81 (1965).
226. An extended version of this analysis is applicable to so-called "exceptional" statutes. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmrt. c (1965) ("There are . . . exceptional statutes
which are intended to place the entire responsibility for the harm which has occurred upon the
defendant. A statute may be found to have that purpose particularly where it is enacted in order
to protect a certain class of persons against their own inability to protect themselves.") Excep-
tional statutes are per se statutes designed to protect, for example, minors against themselves. As
such, it would be illogical to permit an affirmative defense to operate based upon the conduct of
the minor-plaintiff. See generally Del E. Webb Corp. v. Superior Court, 726 P.2d 580, 583 (Ariz.
1986) (dram shop case); Crown v. Raymond, 764 P.2d 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (sale of gun to
minor).
227. Although primarily an example of horizontal collapse, negligence per se does have some
aspects of a vertical collapse. By definition, a negligence per se characterization almost always
leads to liability in a particular case. However, the use of that allocation model is dependent upon
a characterization that follows from the (in this case, collapsed) operational rules. The doctrine's
allocational effect has caused at least one trial court to refuse the per se instruction for that reason
alone. See Herbst v. Miller, 830 P.2d 1268 (Mont. 1992) (reversing a ruling for defendant and
finding that the absence of a handrail along stairway that plaintiff fell down violated the building
code and was negligence per se because a resolution attached to the code stated that it is unlawful
to "maintain any building or structure. . . contrary to or in violation or any of the proisions of
this Code[]").
228. 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
229. Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) (V'We must be on our guard, however,
against confusing the question of negligence with that of the causal connection between the negli-
gence and the injury."); see also Madenford v. Interstate Lumber & Mill Corp., 153 Conn. 62,
64, 212 A.2d 588 (1965) ("The jury were not required to find that the plaintiff had sustained her
burden of proving that the statutory violation constituted a proximate cause of the decedent's
death."); Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443. 447 (Ky. 1991) ("Such violations of administrative
regulations, like statutory violations, constitute negligence, per se, and the basis for liability if
found to be a substantial factor in causing the result.").
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Although some courts acknowledge that the question of whether a
statute has per se effects raises questions essentially similar to an un-
collapsed analysis, 30 in most per se litigation judicial deliberation of
the collapsed issues is hidden, or "off-camera." 231 Notwithstanding, re-
alization that the court is making a duty, normative breach, or legal
cause decision in per se cases greatly improves the advocate's odds of
making the right type of argument. What is disturbing, however, is
In Brannan v. Nevada Rock & Sand Co., 823 P.2d 291 (Nev. 1992), plaintiff's motorcycle
collided with one of defendant's dump trucks and plaintiff was seriously injured. As a result,
plaintiff brought a negligence per se suit against defendant for failure to maintain the brakes on
the company's truck. The court held that in order to successfully bring a negligence per se suit,
plaintiff must prove two things: (1) that plaintiff was a member of the class to be protected; and
(2) that there was a causal connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's injury. In
this case, the jury was left to determine whether the brakes were improperly maintained in viola-
tion of the law and whether the faulty brakes were a proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 293.
See also Lynn v. Overlook Dev., 403 S.E.2d 469, 473 (N.C. 1991) (holding that although the
violation of a statute that imposes a duty upon the city building inspector in order to promote the
safety of the public, including the plaintiffs, may be negligence per se, such negligence is actiona-
ble only if it is the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff); cf. Peak v. Barlow Homes, Inc., 765
S.W.2d 577 (Ky. App. 1988) (defendant's violation of a service entrance regulation not the proxi-
mate cause of decedent's death); Whitlaw v. Kroger Co., 410 S.E.2d 251, 253 (S.C. 1991)
("Proximate cause requires proof of (1) causation in fact and (2) legal cause. Causation in fact is
proved by establishing the injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligence.
Legal cause is proved by establishing foresecability. . . .A plaintiff therefore proves legal cause
by establishing the injury in question occurred as a natural and probable consequence of the
defendant's negligence.").
230. See, e.g., Koback v. Crook, 366 N.W.2d 857, 859-61 (Wis. 1985) (discussing Sorensen v.
Jarvis, 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1984)).
231. See, e.g., Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1989). In a thoughtful opinion, the
Colorado Supreme Court analyzed a straightforward common law negligence claim against a tav-
ern-owner in terms of duty and proximate cause. With regard to the former, the court stated:
In determining whether the law should impose a duty the court must consider several
factors, including the extent, foreseeability and likelihood of injury, the social utility of
the defendant's conduct, the magnitude of the burden placed on the defendant to guard
against injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.
Id. at 1254 (citation omitted). In discussing what it characterized as proximate cause, the court
noted:
Whether proximate cause exists is a question for the jury and only in the clearest of
cases, where reasonable minds can draw but one inference from the evidence, does the
question become one of law to be determined by the court. . . .While the chain of cau-
sation in some cases may be so attenuated that no proximate cause exists as a matter of
law, such is not the case here.
Id. at 1256-57 (citation omitted). Notwithstanding its apparent comfort level with modern tort
doctrine, the court's reasoning disappeared from view when it dealt with the petitioner's negli-
gence per se allegation, adopting Osborne-like language: "The plaintiff must also show that he or
she is a member of the class of persons whom the statute was intended to protect and that the




that per se cases seem to exhibit something of a double collapse. Typi-
cally a court will concentrate on only one of the collapsed issues (duty,
normative breach, or legal cause), as though the collapse has been
taken as a signal for simplifying the decision-making process.
Some of the best illustrations of the varied approaches courts take
to collapsed torts are to be found in the so-called dram shop cases.
Most jurisdictions began with a common law no-liability rule premised
on the proposition that third-party injuries were caused by consuming
rather than furnishing the alcoholic beverage. 232 As jurisdictions
rethought the no-liability rule (or negative allocation model), they used
quite different modes of analysis. Compare the language from three
cases all dealing with an essentially similar fact pattern.
Vesely v. Sager233 concerned a motorist injured in an automobile
accident with an allegedly drunk tavern patron. The court held the
state's dram shop act to have per se effect:
A duty of care, and the attendant standard of conduct
required of a reasonable man, may of course be found in a
legislative enactment which does not provide for civil liability.
In this state a presumption of negligence arises from the viola-
tion of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of per-
sons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of
harm which the plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation of
the statute.
• . . Our conclusion concerning the legislative purpose
• . . is compelled by Business and Professions Code, which
states that one of the purposes of the Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Act is to protect the safety of the people of this state.
Moreover, our interpretation . . . finds support in the deci-
232. See, e.g., Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432 226 A.2d 383 (1967); Allen v. County of
Westchester, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 489 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1985);
Sorensen v. Jarvis, 350 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Wis. 1984). Cf. Reid v. Terwilliger, 22 N.F_. 1091
(N.Y. 1889). In this dubious endeavor the courts have been joined by state legislatures. See. e.g..
CAL CrV. CODE § 1714(b) (West 1985) ("[T]he furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the prox-
imate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person."); Mo
ANN. STAT. §537.053.2 (Vernon 1988) ("The legislature hereby declares. . . the consumption of
alcoholic beverages, rather than the furnishing of alcoholic beverages, to be the proximate cause
of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person."). See also Sigman v. Seafood Ltd.
817 P.2d 527, 530 (Colo. 1991) (interpreting a Colorado statute).
233. 486 P.2d 151 (Cal. 1971).
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sions of those jurisdictions in which similar statutes, and stat-
utes prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors, have
been found to have been enacted for the purpose of protecting
members of the general public against injuries resulting from
intoxication.234
In spite of the court's apparently breakthrough pronouncement that the
issue "is not one of proximate cause, but rather one of duty," 230 Vesely
is principally cited as authority for the proposition that the consump-
tion of the alcohol does not constitute an intervening cause as a matter
of law where a third party is injured.3 In fact, the court's key lan-
guage in determining the result of the case is clearly reminiscent of
Osborne and the Second Restatement, suggesting that the court was
using normative breach reasoning.23 7
In Koback v. Crook,23 8 alcoholic beverages had been supplied to a
minor by social hosts. On appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, itself a hint that the Wisconsin courts were using a duty analy-
sis, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held such conduct to be negli-
gence per se. Because the defendants made contemporary no-duty ar-
guments, 3 9 the court had to face arguments going to "special
relationship,"240 loss redistribution and insurance, 241 effective deter-
rence mechanisms, 242 and false positives. 243 As noted in the similar case
of Slade v. Smith's Management Corp.:
The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation
of a statute is to conclusively establish the first two elements
of a cause of action in negligence. Here, those elements in-
234. Id. at 159 (citation omitted).
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Slicer v. Quigley, 189 Conn. 252, 257, 429 A.2d 855, 858 (1980); Sutter v.
Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ga. 1985); Masaichi Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533, 538
(Haw. 1980); Slade v. Smith's Management Corp., 808 P.2d 401, 410 (Idaho 1991).
237. See also Douglas v. Freeman, 814 P.2d 1160, 1169 (Wash. 1991) (breach of statutorily
defined duty of care owed to dental patients).
238. 366 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 1985).
239. See also Paskiet v. Quality State Oil Co., 476 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Wis. 1991). The Pas-
kiet court noted that "where there is a completed chain of causation between negligence and
damages, we may nevertheless deny recovery against a vendor as a matter of public policy," and
proceeded to use duty-like language. Id. The classic contemporary statement on duty arguments is
the Weirum-Rowland criteria. See infra text accompanying notes 250-55.
240. Koback, 366 N.W.2d at 861.
241. Id. at 861-62.
242. Id. at 863.
243. Id. (fraudulent claims).
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elude a duty to the plaintiff. . . and a breach of that duty.
Thus these elements (duty and breach) are "taken away from
the jury."244
One question that arises regarding negligence per se is whether
judges decide issues presented in collapsed form differently from when
they face the same issues in uncollapsed form. Note, for example, that
the concurrence in Koback made it clear that liability would not be
found in the case of'a social host providing alcohol to an adult, a situa-
tion not covered by the statute. 24 5 This suggests that the presence of the
legislatively enacted norm has a considerable effect on decision makers.
Finally, compare the same fact pattern analyzed with legal causa-
tion language. In Ely v. Murphy,24 1 another social-host case, the court,
reacting to older case law denying recovery on the basis of legal causa-
tion,247 stated:
In view of the legislative determination that minors are incom-
petent to assimilate responsibly the effects of alcohol and lack
the legal capacity to do so, logic dictates that their consump-
tion of alcohol does not, as a matter of law, constitute the in-
tervening act necessary to break the chain of proximate causa-
tion and does not, as a matter of law, insulate one who
provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury.24 8
In all three cases, the courts were dealing with the same basic fact
pattern. All three decisions held that the state statute had per se effect.
All three decisions approached the ruling in a collapsed way, in that
the courts did not fully uncollapse the tort, but selected a single uncol-
lapsed issue to deal with: in the first case, normative breach; in the
second, duty; and in the third, legal cause. Of the three, Vesely v.
Sager uses the most elusive reasoning, hiding behind "purpose of the
statute" language.
244. 808 P.2d 401, 408 (Idaho 1991) (citations and references omitted). See also Ohio Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 510-12 (Okla. 1991) (discussing inebriants cause of action in
both collapsed and uncollapsed terms); cf. id. at 521-24 (Lavender, J., dissenting in part); Id. at
524 (Wilson, J., dissenting); Christen v. Lee, 780 P.2d 1307 (Wash. 1989) (holding that the
statute in question, an automobile statute, was designed to protect third parties against foreseeable
hazards, thus defendant's stabbing plaintiff after an unrelated car accident was not foreseeable as
a matter of law).
245. Koback, 366 N.W.2d at 866.
246. 207 Conn. 88, 540 A.2d 54 (1988).
247. See supra note 232.
248. 207 Conn. at 95, 540 A.2d at 58.
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Given that the result in all three cases was the same, why should it
matter if a court chooses one uncollapsed issue rather than another as
the basis for its analysis? The answer is that when constructing argu-
ments before the court, it is useful to know how a particular court ap-
proaches particular fact patterns in the face of per se arguments. For
example, a detected tendency to use duty would lead to more abstract,
or even explicitly allocational, arguments from counsel, while norma-
tive breach or legal causation reasoning would attract fact-sensitive or
fact-intensive arguments, respectively. 249
2. Duty and Risk-Assessment
California's influence on the development of modern and post-
modern negligence law was based principally on the adoption of an ex-
plicit and activist approach to duty. Although many jurisdictions con-
tinue to be openly hostile to the duty concept, 50 in Rowland v. Chris-
tian,251 and Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.,252 the California Supreme
249. An additional reason for the analysis might exist if there is extant state authority decid-
ing the fact pattern in an uncollapsed (i.e., not per se) manner. See, e.g., Newport v. Moran, 721
P.2d 465 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). Assume, for example, that prior authority has tended to lean
against recovery on this fact pattern on legal-cause grounds. It is likely that, left to its own de-
vices, a court asked to decide a per se argument in the same fact pattern would pick on legal cause
and track the non-per se decision. Therefore, it would make strategic sense for a party seeking a
different result to make duty-like arguments.
250. See, e.g., Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist., 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987); Donaca v. Curry
County, 734 P.2d 1339, 1340 (Or. 1987); Kimbler v. Stillwell, 734 P.2d 1344 (Or. 1987).
251. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). The Rowland court described the type of analysis used in this
approach:
A departure from this fundamental principle [of a general duty of care] involves the
balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. at 564.
252. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). The Weirum court further refined the analysis to be used in
determining the duty owed:
The determination of duty is primarily a question of law. It is the court's "expression of
the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particu-
lar plaintiff is entitled to protection." Any number of considerations may justify the im-
position of duty in particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, our con-
tinually refined concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social
judgment as to where the loss should fall. While the question whether one owes a duty to
another must be decided on a case-by-case basis, every case is governed by the rule of
general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others
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Court melded allocational and ostensibly operational aspects to arrive
at a fresh approach to the judicial determination of duty.
These two cases constructed a general approach to duty of care
that could be used to deconstruct existing pockets of doctrinal resis-
tance. For example, the Rowland court used its more conceptual ap-
proach to replace the doctrine based on the type of entrant that had
long dominated the law of premises liability.2 3 Similarly, the Weirum
court was able to stare down an intervening-cause argument notwith-
standing that the plaintiffs injuries were the result of an automobile
collision with a third party participating in the defendant's radio
contestaM1
Nevertheless, Weirum precipitated a partial collapse. The case
came to the-California Supreme Court on appeal from an order deny-
ing defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In
addition to the duty issue that the court correctly stated as involving
foreseeability, the court was faced with the question whether there was
foresight on the facts of this particular case. The court's response was
uncontroversial, noting that "[w]hile duty is a question of law, foresee-
ability is a question of fact for the jury."20 5 However, discussing "duty
foreseeability" in such close proximity to "breach foreseeability"
tempted collapse, a temptation indulged in by the majority of the su-
preme court in Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 256
An apparently unremarkable case, Bigbee involved the user of a
telephone booth who was injured when an automobile driven by an in-
toxicated driver jumped the curb and struck the booth. What brought
Bigbee notoriety257 and the attention of the California Supreme Court
from being injured as the result of their conduct. However, foresecability of the risk is a
primary consideration in establishing the element of duty.
Id. at 39 (citations and footnote omitted).
253. 443 P.2d at 564-68.
254. It avoided this argument in foreseeability terms:
It is of no consequence that the harm to decedent wias inflicted by third parties acting
- negligently. Defendant invokes the maxim that an actor is entitled to assume that others
will not act negligently. This concept is valid, however, only to the extent the intervening
conduct was not to be anticipated. If the likelihood that a third person may react in a
particular manner is a hazard which makes the actor negligent, such reaction whether
innocent or negligent does not prevent the actor from bcing liable for the harm caused
thereby. Here, reckless conduct by youthful contestants, stimulated by derendant's broad-
cast, constituted the hazard to which decedent was exposed.
539 P.2d at 40 (citations omitted).
255. Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
256. 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983).
257. Bigbee settled his claim with the telephone company only to find his victory criticized in
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was that the plaintiff brought his action against the companies alleg-
edly responsible for the design, location, installation, and maintenance
of the telephone booth.
The trial court granted defendants" motion to dismiss. The resul-
tant appeal to the California Supreme Court exposed the potential for
collapsing California's complex duty determinant. For the majority,
Chief Justice Bird seized upon the statement in Weirum that "foresee-
ability is a question of fact for the jury."25 For the Chief Justice,
therefore, "[t]urning to the merits of this case, the question presented
is a relatively simple one. Is there room for a reasonable difference of
opinion as to whether the risk that a car might crash into the phone
booth and injure an individual inside was reasonably foreseeable under
the circumstances . . . ?,259
Of course, for the majority in Bigbee, constructive foresight was
not an issue. After all, there were declarations on the record that a
similar accident had occurred at this location, and that the defendants
had reacted by erecting steel bumper posts. Unsurprisingly, the court
concluded:
Indeed, in light of the circumstances of modern life, it seems
evident that a jury could reasonably find that defendants
should have foreseen the possibility of the very accident which
actually occurred here. Swift traffic on a major thoroughfare
late at night is to be expected. Regrettably, so too are intoxi-
cated drivers. Moreover, it is not uncommon for speeding and/
or intoxicated drivers to lose control of their cars and crash
into poles, buildings or whatever else may be standing along-
side the road they travel-no matter how straight and level
that road may be.
Where a telephone booth, which is difficult to exit, is
placed 15 feet from such a thoroughfare, the risk that it might
be struck by a car veering off the street, thereby causing in-
jury to a person trapped within, cannot be said to be unfore-
seeable as a matter of law.260
a May 1986 speech by President Ronald Reagan as an example of the problems with the torts
system. Leon Daniel, Witnesses Hit Insurers' Claims About Damage Awards, UPI, July 24, 1986,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
258. The Chief Justice prefaced her statement with the qualifier "ordinarily." 665 P.2d at
950.
259. Id. at 951.
260. Id. at 952 (citation omitted).
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Obviously, the flaw here was in the court's incorrect characterization of
the issue. As understood in Rowland and Weirum, a "duty" analysis of
Bigbee would focus on the abstract determination of whether redistri-
bution should be permitted in this fact pattern. In contrast, Bigbee in-
dulged in a fact-specific inquiry whether this particular defendant had
been at fault given that it had actually foreseen the injury-producing
event. In choosing the latter approach, the Bigbee majority collapsed an
abstract duty issue into an individual risk-assessment determination.
This misstep was seized upon by the minority in Bigbee.21 For
Justice Kroninger, the issue clearly was one of duty, and an issue gov-
erned by the Rowland-Weirurn criteria. In other words "foreseeability
is but one of many considerations in weighing the question of whether a
duty should be found to exist. . . .[T]here are many situations involv-
ing foreseeable risks where there is no duty. Foreseeability does not
establish duty; it merely defines its limits.1 2 2
When he applied the Rowland-Weirum factors to the pleadings
regarding the negligent location allegation, Justice Kroninger
concluded:
Risk of harm from third persons is similarly inherent and fore-
seeable in pedestrian activities in proximity to vehicular traf-
fic. By themselves, however, those risks are not deemed unrea-
sonable and accordingly, without more, as a matter of law no
one should be said to be under a duty of care to protect others
from them, particularly where, as here, there is no reason to
believe that the party sought to be charged was in a superior
position to foresee the risk of harm.
The location of the telephone booth here, 15 feet from the
curb, beside a straight and level roadway, and adjacent to a
building, provided, if anything, more protection from the risk
of curb-jumping automobiles than the adjacent sidewalk itself.
To hold that defendants could be found liable for locating the
booth where they did is tantamount to holding that one may
be found negligent whenever he conducts everyday activities
on or adjacent to the public sidewalk. It will go far toward
making all roadside businesses insurers of safety from way-
ward travelers.
261. Justice Kroninger dissented with regard to the plaintifrs location argument, but con-
curred with regard to his defective maintenance allegation. Id. at 955-56 (Kroningcr, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
262. Id. at 955 (citation omitted).
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There is no suggestion of anything defendants might rea-
sonably have done differently with respect to siting except
simply not to maintain a telephone booth in the vicinity at all.
Public telephones have, in fact, long been maintained adjacent
to streets and highways for the convenience of the public, de-
spite the obvious but remote risks. . . . Balancing the gravity
and likelihood of danger against the usefulness of conveniently
located public telephones, and applying each of the other"considerations" enumerated in Rowland, I would opt for en-
couraging their continued maintenance adjacent to streets and
highways, and would hold that on the present facts there arose
no duty which could impose liability based on location of the
booth.26 3
Bigbee suggested a serious split from Rowland and Weirum. The
factors developed in those earlier cases were uncollapsed from a hidden
world of duty-proximate analysis, and designed to facilitate increasing
loss redistribution.264 Given the opinions in Bigbee, it appears there was
a growing sentiment that the openly discussed and presumably briefed
Rowland-Weirum factors provided too many opportunities for defense
arguments designed to trigger motions to dismiss. In reaction, the Big-
bee majority favored a horizontal collapse, collapsing duty into risk-
assessment. Such a fact-intensifying approach guarantees a reduction
in cases being decided on an abstract, "failure to state" basis .26
It was not until Ballard v. Uribe266 that California's highest court
263. Id. at 955-56 (footnote and cross-references omitted). Compare the majority's view of the
application of the Weirum-Rowland factors:
In terms of the various factors suggested by Rowland v. Christian it is undisputed that
plaintiff suffered serious injury. An affirmative finding on foreseeability by the jury would
obviously establish not only "the foresecability of harm to plaintiff" but also a sufficiently
"close[] connection between the defendant[s'] conduct and the injury suffered." As to the
remaining factors, although defendants' conduct may have been without "moral blame,"
imposition of liability would further the policy of "preventing future harm." Finally, im-
position of liability would not be unduly burdensome to defendants given the probable
availability of insurance for these types of accidents which defendants themselves main-
tain do not recur with great frequency.
This is not to say, of course, that defendants are liable for plaintiff's injury. This
court decides only that this question is one that should be reserved for a jury.
Id. at 953 n.14 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). For an even more explicit application of
the Weirum-Rowland factors, see Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 110-17 (Ct. App.
1991) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 251-55.
265. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
266. 715 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1986).
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once again proclaimed an uncollapsed duty:
[T]he "foreseeability" concept plays a variety of roles in tort
doctrine generally; in some contexts it is a question of fact for
the jury, whereas in other contexts it is part of the calculus to
which a court looks in defining the boundaries of "duty."
The question of "duty" is decided by the court, not the
jury. . . . The foreseeability of a particular kind of harm
plays a very significant role in [the duty] calculus, but a
court's task-in determining "duty"-is not to decide whether
a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in
light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evalu-
ate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct
at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm ex-
perienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the
negligent party.
The jury, by contrast, considers "foreseeability" in two
more focused, fact-specific settings. First, the jury may con-
sider the likelihood or foreseeability of injury in determining
whether, in fact, the particular defendant's conduct was negli-
gent in the first place. Second, foreseeability may be relevant
to the jury's determination of whether the defendant's negli-
gence was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff's
injury. 67
Ballard makes an important contribution to the maintenance of an
uncollapsed tort of negligence, by making a clear distinction between
the role of foreseeability in the court's abstract duty analysis and its
role in the jury's determination of risk-assessment.6 8 In fact Ballard
267. Id. at 628-29 n.6 (citations omitted).
268. This distinction was described in Ballard as "whether a particular plaintiff's Injury was
reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct." Id. at 628 n.6 (emphasis
added). See also Lopez v. McDonald's, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Ct. App. 1987), where the court
stated:
Although the breadth of "duty" is decided by the court as a question of law depen-
dent upon a variety of relevant factors including foresecability of the risk of harm as the
principal consideration, it is often misleadingly stated that although duty is a question of
law, foreseeability is a question of fact which must be decided by the trier of fact in any
case about which reasonable minds can differ. To the contrary, where it is one factor to
which a court looks in defining the boundaries of "duty", foreseeability of the particular
kind of harm is strictly a question of law when evaluated within the general context of
"whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the
kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent
party." However, foreseeability is a question of fact, which must be decided by a trier of
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lacks only in the omission of two subtleties.
First, if fact-intensive foreseeability is part of risk-assessment but
not duty, what exactly is being examined by the court at the duty
stage, sub nomine "foreseeability"? After all, the natural meanings of
foreseeability are factual. Thus, it must be concluded that the foresee-
ability inquiry in the duty context must be more normative; i.e., in the
sense of the normative question whether members of this defendant-
class should contemplate this general type of risk.2"' At the very least,
it may be suggested that courts committing to an uncollapsed duty in-
quiry, but continuing to place an over-emphasis on an apparently em-
pirical foreseeability inquiry, as part of the duty analysis, are flirting
with the danger of collapse.2170
The second omission from the Ballard formulation has been a
source of considerable confusion; indeed, it is probably the explanation
for the doctrinal misstep in Bigbee, if not that court's allocational mo-
tive. The troublesome, over-generalizing statement that "foreseeability
is a question of fact for the jury" may be successfully declawed by
following Ballard and resisting any duty/risk-assessment collapse. The
trick is to realize that sometimes the risk-assessment foreseeability is
for the court as a matter of law. As with any essentially factual in-
quiry, there will be times when the court should and will take the issue
from the hands of the jury.217 Error creeps in when this is viewed as
somehow changing the essence of the inquiry, rather than noncontro-
versial jury control.21 2 In sum, the fact that the foreseeability element
of risk-assessment is usually a matter of fact, but may in a clear case
be a matter of law, does not justify a spurious corollary that while the
foreseeability aspect of duty is a matter of law, in a close case it may
be a matter of fact for the jury.2
fact, in any case about which reasonable minds can differ within the more focused, fact-
specific settings of breach of duty and causation.
Id. at 443 n.6 (quoting Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 628 n.6 (Cal. 1986)) (citations omitted).
269. See, e.g., Sally G. v. Orange Glen Estates Homeowners, 227 Cal. Rptr. 559, 563 (Ct.
App. 1986) ("Accordingly, within a general context here, it is imminently foreseeable the condi-
tion of the property (the clubhouse) may contribute to or facilitate the wrongful acts of third
persons, resulting in the kind of harm [plaintiffs] suffered.").
270. See, e.g., Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 102 (Ct. App. 1991).
271. See, e.g., King v. United States, 756 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (E.D. Cal. 1990); Weissich v.
County of Marin, 274 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1990) (proximate causation decided as a matter
of law).
272. See generally Lopez, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436.
273. Cf. Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 706 F.2d 1027 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). "It is well-settled that the existence of 'duty' is a ques-
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V. CONCLUSION: MOTIVATING COLLAPSE
Beyond appreciating the collapse phenomenon as a judicial tech-
nique, at least two questions remain. First, to what extent do our judi-
cial decision makers consciously use collapse, and second, can we detect
any broad patterns motivating collapse or particular forms of collapse?
At one level, collapse may be dismissed as no more than an exer-
cise in doctrinal simplification, as an opportunity to cull redundant op-
erational rules, rather than as a component of a broader stratagem.
Such an interpretation might be argued for, say, the collapse of legal
cause into risk-assessment. In the literature, that famous collapse fre-
quently is referred to as the "within the risk" approach to legal
cause. 74 Yet, a more intellectually exciting motivation might exist in
that the within-the-risk collapsed approach appeals to those who value
proportionality and lowered administrative costs.270 Similarly, courts
are not above using collapse as part of a broader strategy.270
However, the most prevalent judicial motives underlying collapse
and uncollapse are allocational; those motives receive their operational
effect through the variable of jury control. It is with regard to that
variable that a real allocational distinction between vertical and hori-
zontal collapse should be noted.
In general terms, vertically collapsed tdrts such as ultrahazardous
activity tend to concentrate decisional power in the allocation
tion of law. As is often stated, duty is 'only an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id.
(citations omitted). The court supported that statement with a footnote: "Although foreseability
of risk, which is of primary importance in this case, is usually a question of fact, it becomes a
question of law where reasonable minds cannot differ." Id. at 29 n.l.
274. Possibly the most famous justification for this collapse was put forward by Viscount Si-
monds in The Wagon Mound No. I:
[I]t does not seem consonant with current ideas of justice or morality that, for an act of
negligence, however slight or venial, which results in some trivial foreseeable damage, the
actor should be liable for all consequences, however unforeseeable and however grave, so
long as they can be said to be "direct.' It is a principle of civil liability, subject only to
qualifications which have no present relevance, that a man must be considered to be
responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To demand more of him is too harsh
a rule, to demand less is to ignore that civilised order requires the observ-ance of a mini-
mum standard of behaviour.
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng. Co. (The Wagon Mound), 1961 App. Cas.
388, 422-23 (P.C.). The Wagon Mound rejected the heretofore dominant Polenls rule. In re
Polemis, 3 K.B. 560, 572 (1921 C.A.) (per Bankes, L.J., "Given the breach of duty which consti-
tutes the negligence, and given the damage as a direct result of that negligence, the anticipations
of the person whose negligent act has produced the damage appear to mc to be irrelevant.").
275. See generally William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Micit L REv 1. 17 (1953).
276. Recall the analysis of the Beshada case. See supra text accompanying notes 197-211.
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model-an issue typically reserved for the judge.2" As a technique,
therefore, vertical collapse will tend to surface in areas where the
courts want to exercise tight control of the doctrine. Such has been the
case with the Rylands v. Fletcher and ultrahazardous activity torts that
have been successfully, albeit quietly, 7 8 restricted to fact patterns in-
volving landowners. Caution also is displayed when courts experiment
with new allocation models, such as "stricter" product liability. Al-
though caution is justified during the developmental stage, the opaque-
ness of a vertically collapsed tort renders comprehension and critique
difficult.
In contrast, horizontal collapse usually connotes an absence of ju-
dicial circumspection. Courts that horizontally collapse doctrinal struc-
tures do so to decrease the amount of jury control, thereby increasing
net risk-redistribution. For example, the partially collapsed Bigbee ma-
jority will tend to produce more plaintiff victories than the uncollapsed
Bigbee minority. 7 9
Although just one judicial technique among many, and clearly
sharing space on a conceptual continuum with the approaches of analo-
gizing and moving from general rules to exceptions, doctrinal collapse
is a more extreme technique than the doctrinal simplification it often
seems to resemble. As a technique that is gaining in judicial popularity,
collapse, particularly where it signifies abrogation of jury control in
favor of unbridled and unexplained risk-redistribution, may be more
than a technique of reasoning-it also indicates a predetermined allo-
cational conclusion.
277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 cmt. 1 (1977) (specific in keeping
the characterization in the hands of the judge); Matomco Oil Co. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc., 796
P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Alaska 1990) (submitting ultrahazardousness issue to jury constituted re-
versible error).
278. Cf. Strickland v. Fowler, 499 So. 2d 199, 201 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "[t]he
marketing of handguns to the general public falls far beyond the boundaries of the Louisiana
doctrine of ultrahazardous activities. It is not an activity related to land or other immovables
... ) (emphasis added).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 256-65.
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